

RUMOR CONTROL CENTERS AS INTERMITTENT ORGANIZATIONS:

A STUDY OF A NEGLECTED ORGANIZATIONAL TYPE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

John Richard Ponting, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1973

Reading Committee:

E. L. Quarantelli

R. R. Dynes

A. C. Clarke

Approved By

E. L. Quarantelli

Adviser
Department of Sociology

© 1974

JOHN RICHARD PONTING

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have contributed in direct or indirect ways to the fruition of this research endeavour. Among those offering a more tangible form of assistance were Lenore Kligman, Jay Michels, and Cathy Scheib, who conducted the tedious mechanics of early data analysis, and Disaster Research Center staff colleagues Sue Blanshan, Paul Cass, Tom Forrest, Ern Teuber, and Jerry Waxman, who assisted in the collection of data. In addition, I wish to thank DRC Administrative Assistant Ms. Barbara Tootle, who not only assisted in the typing, but spent many hours attending to the minute details involved in arranging my numerous data collection forays to cities across the continent. And to Jeanette Seeman special thanks are also due, for it was she who typed the final manuscript, under less than ideal conditions.

Rod Kueneman's contribution consists of not only his conscientious administrative and data collection assistance, but also his friendship, sense of humour, and support as a compatriot. And field trips with Rod and Jack Daniels were always a delight.

Also of direct support were the United States National Institute of Mental Health, who funded the data collection, and the Canada Emergency Measures Organization, whose Fellowship supported me throughout my graduate career and made it possible for me to join

the Disaster Research Center. The sincere personal interest shown in me and my career by Mr. C. R. Patterson, the Director-General of Canada EMO, and his Scientific Adviser, Mr. Burke Stannard, is very much appreciated.

I should also like to take this opportunity to thank the members of my dissertation committee, Professors Alfred C. Clarke, Russell R. Dynes, E. L. Quarantelli (Chairman), Herbert E. Rie, and John Seidler, who gave so generously of their own time to serve in this capacity.

The study would not have been possible had it not been for the kind and extended co-operation of the participants, to whom I owe special thanks.

To Professor Dynes and to my graduate adviser, Professor Quarantelli, I should also like to direct a special word of appreciation. Professor Quarantelli, more than any other, has shaped my interests, raised my sights, and instilled confidence and professional standards in me.

This study is dedicated to my wife Pat, for her patience, sacrifice, and understanding, and to my mother and late father who not only instilled in me the value of education, but both gave up so much that I might pursue it.

VITA

- February 17, 1948 . . . Born - Welland, Ontario, Canada
- 1969 B.A., The University of Western Ontario,
London, Ontario, Canada
- 1969-1973 Research Associate, The Disaster Research
Center, Department of Sociology, The Ohio
State University
- 1970 M.A., The Ohio State University
- Autumn Quarter 1971 . . Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University
- Autumn Quarter 1972 . . Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University
- 1973 Assistant Professor, The University of
Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada

AWARDS

- 1966-1969 Carla C. Conway Scholarship, Continental Can
Company of Canada Limited
- 1969-1973 Canada Emergency Measures Organization
Fellowship

PUBLICATIONS

- "Rumor Control Centers - Their Emergence and Operations." American Behavioral Scientist 16 (January-February 1973): 391-401.
- "Emergency Welfare Services in Civil Disorders." Emergency Measures Organization National Digest 12 (February-March 1972): 11-16.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Sociology

Collective Behavior and Social Movements. Professor E. L. Quarantelli

Racial, Ethnic, and Minority Relations. Professor James Vander Zanden

Macro-level Social Organization. Professor Russell R. Dynes

Sociology of Disaster. Professors Russell R. Dynes and E. L. Quarantelli

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
VITA	iv
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The Concept of Intermittence	
The Organizational Context of Intermittent Organizations	
Outline of the Remaining Chapters	
II. METHODOLOGY	15
The Sample	
Data Collection and Sources	
Data Analysis	
Methodological Issues	
III. A MODEL OF CRISIS-ORIENTED INTERMITTENT ORGANIZATIONS .	33
Review of the Literature	
Presentation of the Model	
IV. DATA ANALYSIS	53
Introduction	
Case Study	
Emergence	
External Relations: Goals, Clientele, and Inter-organizational Relationships	
Internal Structure	
Examination of the Theoretical Model	
Summary	

Chapter	Page
V. CONCLUSION	104
Summary	
A Note on the Effectiveness and Future of RCCs	
Evaluation of the Study	
Suggestions for Future Research	
APPENDIX	
A	121
B	136
C	141
D	144
BIBLIOGRAPHY	146

LIST OF TABLES

Title	Page
1. A Classification of Intermittent Organizations	5
2. Phase Characteristics According to Parsons, Bales, and Shils	37
3. Activities in the Phases of Intermittent Organizations . .	44
4. Rumor Control Centers by Region and Median Rank of Date of Origin	63
5. Staff Sizes of RCCs in Crisis and in Non-Crisis Times . .	77
6. Number of Persons Added to RCCs in Crisis Times	78
7. Number of Hierarchical Levels in Crisis and in Non-Crisis Times	79
8. Number of Hierarchical Levels Added in Crisis Times . . .	79
9. Frequency Distribution of Scores of Differentiation of RCCs from Parent Organization	82
10. Frequency Distribution of Formalization Scores of RCCs . .	84
11. Frequency Distribution of Structural Complexity Scores of RCCs	86
12. Results of Tests of Hypotheses	89

LIST OF FIGURES

Title	Page
1. A Systems Model of Intermittent Organizations	45
2. Index of Differentiation of RCCs from Parent Organization	81
3. Index of Formalization of RCCs	85
4. Index of Structural Complexity of RCCs	87

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization -- that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy -- is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability.¹

So said Max Weber. But recent administrators and observers have shown that this view is too limited. Weber failed to anticipate how changes in society as a whole would necessitate changes in the optimal forms of human social organization. For instance, Bennis and Slater² and others³ have all pointed out that organizational forms, if they are to serve their intended purpose, must be compatible or congruent with the society in which they are located. Thus, they must adapt to changes in their social environment, if they are to continue to fulfill their intended purpose. As Alvin Toffler puts it: "Traditional functional organization structures, created to meet predictable, non-novel conditions, prove incapable of responding effectively to radical changes in the environment."⁴

This study takes as its central focus a particular type of organization -- the crisis-oriented intermittent organization as

represented by rumor control centers -- which is designed to respond to just such changes in the environment. However, the scope of the study is broader in that it does extend to include a consideration of the generic phenomenon of intermittent organization ("IOs") which are not created to meet such environmental "turbulence."

There are two major purposes to the study. One is to provide a descriptive account of rumor control centers (RCCs), since they have not previously been subjected to sociological attention. The second is to improve upon the existing conceptualization of intermittence in the literature by developing and illustrating a model of intermittent organizations, and then testing hypotheses derived from it. In that model, intermittent organizations (or intermittent sub-units of organizations) will be viewed as subsystems of a more encompassing system. The primary research focus will be on the internal structure of that system, particularly on how the internal structure is related to the external environment.

Before embarking upon these tasks, however, the generic phenomenon of intermittent organizations will be introduced in this chapter. Examples will be presented and the concept will be explained and defined. Then intermittent organizations will be placed in the context of their relation to other forms of social organization. The chapter concludes with an outline of the subsequent chapters.

The Concept of Intermittence

At the core of the concept of intermittent organization is the notion of a shift in the structure of an organization across time. Georg Simmel was apparently the first sociologist to discuss shifting structures of various organizations. For instance, he studied the differences between the "peace"-time and "war"-time social organization of phenomena ranging from whole societies (North American Indians) on the macro level, to craft guilds (London tailors in the first quarter of the nineteenth century) on the micro level.⁵

Amitai Etzioni was the next sociologist to explicitly address the concept in any detail from a social organization viewpoint.⁶ Concerned mainly with compliance in organizations, he contended that some organizations optimally require different forms of compliance at different time periods. So, he maintained, to avoid the neutralizing effects of competing modes of compliance, an organization specializes by focusing on one major task at a time, emphasizing one form of compliance at a time, and shifting its task and compliance structures after relatively short periods.

Etzioni did not provide a denotative definition of intermittence, only a connotative one. Thus, he identifies intermittent organizations simply by noting that they are organizations or organizational units which are deployed and then "folded up" until their period of activity arrives again.⁷ They are characterized, according to him, by tasks which require a considerable change in amount and pace of activity (more change, even, than in the other types of organizations sharing

this "successive" division of compliance), by a shift from a dormant state to an active state, and by their use of various "reinforcing structures and processes" to maintain the commitment of their lower level participants in the dormant period.⁸ Other authors cite as characteristics of intermittent organizations their flat "shape," structural flexibility, and simple and equalitarian normative structure.⁹ And, of course, most intermittent organizational units have a "parent" or over-arching organization with which they are affiliated.

Empirical examples of intermittent organizations or intermittent organizational units are widespread in modern industrial society. They may be found in such diverse settings as the following, to cite just a few: radical political parties, census bureaus, summer camps and resorts, volunteer fire departments, military reserve units, and most rumor control centers.

Some order can be brought to the variety of these examples if they are cross-classified using dichotomous criteria based on characteristics and conditions of their activated operations, on the one hand, and a condition of their environment on the other hand. Under the latter, an important concept is the degree of predictability (which exists at the time of de-activation of the intermittent unit) concerning the time when the next activation will take place. As for their activated operations, two important dimensions are the duration of the average or typical activation period (dichotomized for the present purpose at the thirty-day point) and the frequency of activation over, say, a two-year period. Table 1 shows the distribution of numerous different IOs under such a cross-classification.

TABLE 1

A CLASSIFICATION OF INTERMITTENT ORGANIZATIONS

Predictability of Activation	
Low	High
Duration of Average Activation	Duration of Average Activation
Brief (< 30 days)	Prolonged (≥ 30 days)
Brief (< 30 days)	Prolonged (≥ 30 days)
<p>Activation Frequency (per 2-year period)</p> <p>Infrequent</p> <p>Most RCCs Fire department task forces Local Civil Defense organizations</p>	<p>Some splinter political parties (especially in parliamentary systems of government)</p> <p>Inventory departments Census bureaus Annual parades & festivals (e.g., fall fair) Olympic Games Some professional associations</p> <p>Some summer schools Camps & resorts Home construction industry Income tax assistance organizations</p>
<p>Frequent</p> <p>Volunteer Fire Departments Some social movement organizations</p>	<p>Military reserve units Church congregations Local rock dance bands</p> <p>Senates & Parliaments</p>

This cross-classificational approach could be used to generate hypotheses relating these environmental and operational conditions to features of the internal structure of IOs. But in this study, Table 1 will simply be used as an ordering device and as a means of identifying how RCCs relate to the wider variety of types of IOs.

From the examples in Table 1 and from the previously cited work by Simmel, it is apparent that intermittent structures may exist at any of several levels of human social organization ranging from the very micro to the very macro. Although phenomena on the non-social level of human experience may also be structured intermittently -- e.g., normative sets on the cultural level or cognitive sets on the psychological level -- the major concern of this study is at the social level with intermittent organizations and intermittent organizational units.

At this level, a very broad definition of an organization is used. An organization is thus defined, in accordance with systems theory, as a special type of social system "primarily oriented to the attainment of a specific goal, which constitutes an output of the system and which is an input for some other system."¹⁰ As a "sensitizing" definition of an intermittent organization the following is suggested:

An intermittent organization is a special type of social sub-system in which there is a periodical and patterned expansion and re-arrangement of the system structure involving the addition of personnel for purposes of attaining specific goals whose relevance to the encompassing social system has increased.

Before proceeding to discuss the advantages of such an organizational form over other forms, two brief comments about this latter definition are in order. First, the duration of the intervals between activations of the intermittent organization is left unspecified due to the fact that it may be highly variable. And second, it should be obvious that in a crisis-oriented intermittent organization such as a rumor control center or civil defense agency, the increase in the relevance of the intermittent organization's goals will usually be relatively sudden and occasioned by some threat to the system.

Now, as a mode of organization, intermittence offers several distinct advantages over other forms. For instance, intermittent organizations are characterized by relatively low costs compared to the expenditure of the parent organization's resources which would otherwise be necessary to maintain continuous, full-scale operation in the face of sporadic demands.¹¹ A further asset is that intermittent organizations may have special characteristics, such as high levels of commitment or high work loads, which would be difficult to sustain in more enduring structures.¹² And to the extent that there is a continuity in the intermittent organization's culture from one activated period to the next, to that extent also will the intermittent organization be a more dependable, controllable, and rapidly mobilized structure than that which might be created ad hoc.

There are many more points of comparison between intermittent organizations and such enduring and ad hoc forms of organization. Since intermittent organizations, especially crisis-oriented ones,

can best be understood in the context of these other two types of social organization, the introduction will conclude below by setting that context.

The Organizational Context of Intermittent Organizations

An emergent organization (or group) is one which has no prior existence in terms of its membership, structure, norms, or public recognition.¹³ Such an ad hoc organization can be conveniently compared with intermittent organizations and with more enduring organizations such as bureaucracies, through the use of Max Weber's ideal-type rational-legal bureaucracy, which is often taken as characteristic of modern mass industrial society.

The ideal-type rational-legal bureaucracy, according to Weber, is characterized by the "continuous organization of official functions."¹⁴ The emergent organization, on the other hand, comes into existence and then, upon completion of its tasks, disappears.

Weber's bureaucracy also includes the selection of members from among candidates on the basis of technical qualifications. This contrasts markedly with emergent organizations, especially in crises situations, where formal selection procedures may not exist and where recruitment may, in the extreme case, be based upon sheer availability of persons.

Separation of the property belonging to the organization from property belonging to the individual organizational member is a third component of Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy. For emergent

organizations, however, appropriation of the property of members of the organization is not at all uncommon. Likewise, the alleged separation in bureaucracy of living quarters from the place in which the official functions are carried out is missing in many emergent organizations.

Two other features of Weber's ideal-type are that administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing and that the organizational member is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of his office. In contrast, Forrest points to the absence of a highly differentiated normative structure in emergent groups, noting that: "Apparently the need for explicit rules and regulations, which so often govern behavior in established organizations, is not imperative in emergent groups."¹⁵

A final comparison to be made here with Weber's ideal type model involves the office as the sole, or at least the primary occupation of the incumbent. This is rarely true for newly emergent organizations, although once the group may be institutionalized there is a possibility of this for some members, especially the leaders.

Where, then, do intermittent organizations lie on this spectrum of organizational variability? In general, it can be said that intermittent organizations represent an intermediate type between enduring complex bureaucracies and ad hoc emergent organizations (or groups). As an intermediate type they possess certain characteristics of each of the polar types. Thus, intermittent organizations, by definition, lack the continuous organization of functions which

characterizes bureaucracies,¹⁶ but unlike emergent organizations, they do not cease to exist upon completion of their tasks. Rather, IOs have mechanisms which provide continuity from one activation to the next, in theory at least.

Intermittent organizations are similar to bureaucracies, rather than emergent organizations, in their use of procedures for selecting organizational members. Even crisis-oriented IOs usually demonstrate at least informal selection procedures based on a more or less specific standard of appropriateness of the candidate for the job.

No universal generalization across all types of intermittent organizations can be made concerning the separation of personal and organizational property in IOs. However, for crisis-oriented IOs, the distinction between personal and organizational property is likely to be blurred, as in emergent organizations. Likewise, the separation of living quarters from the place in which official functions are carried out, is missing in many IOs. This is often especially true for crisis-oriented IOs, which must monitor the environment twenty-four hours per day for signals as to the need to activate the organization.

Intermittent organizations exhibit great variability in their normative structures. However, on this dimension crisis-oriented ones like rumor control centers do resemble Forrest's description of emergent organizations in that the normative structure is simple and characterized not by the calculative "utilitarian" form of compliance found in bureaucracies, but rather by what Etzioni calls

"moral-normative" compliance.¹⁷ And finally, concerning the dimension of the office as the sole or primary occupation of the incumbent, the very nature of intermittence precludes the possibility of this happening in IOs, except for members of the active sub-unit. Thus, the intermittent organization is here more akin to the ad hoc emergent one than to the enduring bureaucratic one.

Overall then, on the basis of these points of comparison, intermittent organizations in general are to be seen as an intermediate type between the enduring and ad hoc emergent types, sharing some characteristics of each. But a particular sub-type of intermittent organizations, the crisis-oriented one, is to be seen as bearing stronger resemblance to emergent organizations. These crisis-oriented intermittent organizations are, of course, a major concern of this study, the remaining chapters of which are outlined below.

Outline of the Remaining Chapters

In the following chapter, the various aspects of the methodology of the study are discussed. That is followed in Chapter III by a review of the related literature and a presentation of a model of crisis-oriented intermittent organizations derived from that literature. Rumor Control Centers, the vehicle by which crisis-oriented intermittent organizations are analyzed, are described at the beginning of Chapter IV. The chapter then proceeds to a testing of the six hypotheses derived from the model in Chapter III, and concludes with a description of how the model as a whole applies to RCCs. Chapter V

concludes the study with an evaluation of the effectiveness of RCCs, an evaluation of the model itself, and suggestions for future research.

Notes: Chapter I

1. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), p. 337.
2. Warren Bennis and Philip Slater, The Temporary Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).
3. Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970), esp. chap. 7, "Organization: The Coming Ad-Hocracy;" Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation (London: Tavistock, 1961); and Berton Kaplan, "Notes on a Non-Weberian Model of Bureaucracy: The Case of Development Bureaucracy," Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (1968): 471-483.
4. Toffler, Future Shock, p. 122.
5. Georg Simmel, Conflict, trans. K. H. Wolff (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956), p. 88.
6. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1961), esp. pp. 288-295.
7. Etzioni, Comparative Analysis, p. 288.
8. Etzioni, Comparative Analysis, p. 288-290.
9. Bartolomeo Palisi, "Some Suggestions About the Transitory-Permanence Dimension of Organizations," British Journal of Sociology 21 (1970): 200-206; and William Friedland and Dorothy Nelkin, "Migrant Labor as a Form of Intermittent Social Organization and as a Channel of Geographic Mobility" (New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, May 1967).
10. Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations," in Complex Organizations, ed. Amitai Etzioni (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962), p. 33.
11. Etzioni, Comparative Analysis, p. 288.
12. Matthew Miles, "On Temporary Systems," chap. 19 in Innovation in Education, ed. Matthew Miles (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964).
13. For a description and analysis of emergent organizations or groups see E. L. Quarantelli, "Emergent Accomodation Groups," in Human Nature and Collective Behavior, ed. Tamotsu Shibutani (Englewood

Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 111-123; and Thomas R. Forrest, "Structural Differentiation in Emergent Groups," (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1972).

14. These and other references to Weber in this section are taken from Max Weber, Social and Economic Organization, pp. 330-334.
15. Forrest, "Differentiation in Emergent Groups," p. 168.
16. Only a few scholars, such as Toffler and Bennis and Slater, have explored the nature of the dis-continuous organization of official functions.
17. Etzioni, Comparative Analysis, p. 14.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this study was initially of the qualitative type and the adaptive flexibility¹ characteristic of such an approach was fully utilized. Thus, over the course of the project, as the data led in new theoretical directions, the analysis and methodology evolved accordingly, such that at points they took on a degree of closure characteristic of a quantitative approach. Therefore, although descriptive data were originally collected for the Disaster Research Center's purposes, the study was re-directed, expanded, or constricted at various points for purposes of this dissertation.

The first parts of this chapter will discuss this methodological progression as it pertains to the "sample" selected and the questionnaires used. Attention is then devoted to the mode of data collection and the nature of the researcher's entree, followed by discussions of the interview procedure and the types of non-interview data which were also used. The ways in which the data were analyzed are then portrayed, and the concluding section of the chapter deals with the methodological issues of reliability, interaction of the researcher with the data, and validity.

The Sample

Perhaps the greatest methodological problem was that of identifying the universe of RCCs. This created the further problem of having to change the sampling strategy, change the mode of data collection, and prolong the main data collection period to a length of eighteen months (ending February 1973). Thus, the original intent was to draw only a sample of a dozen RCCs, stratified along the dimensions of organizational affiliation, city size, geographical region, and percent non-white in the population of the RCC city. To this end, RCCs were identified through the use of several knowledgeable informants located (1) in the "pioneering" Chicago RCC (from which many others sought information on how to establish and operate an RCC); (2) in the Community Relations Service Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, which had sponsored a 1968 conference on RCCs for representatives from around the country; and (3) in the Denver Community Relations Commission, which had conducted a brief mailed survey of "all" RCCs in cities over 300,000 population. A snowball sampling procedure was also used when we asked RCC respondents what other RCCs had contacted them and whether they knew of any other RCC-type organizations or groups in the nearby area.

It became apparent that fewer cities than we had expected did indeed possess an RCC. We noted that this was mainly due to many cities disbanding RCCs which they had used earlier. Thus, our sampling objective changed to that of enumerating the entire universe of RCCs in cities over 100,000 population in the United States. This

required a specification of an operational definition of what we would consider to be an existing RCC.

To establish manageable temporal boundaries, the first criterion was that the RCC must have existed sometime during the period from January 1, 1969 to December 31, 1972. The second criterion, guided by DRC's selection of the community as the level of analysis in its overall program of studies, was that to be included in the study an RCC must have an entire community as its clientele and setting, rather than being specific to one institutional sphere (e.g., an RCC in a university, public school, or public school district).

A further set of criteria pertained to the operational dimension of the organization. Thus, to be included an RCC had to have been mobilized for action for at least two incidents of heightened community tension. Alternatively it could have been activated for one such incident for which the activation period was greater than thirty days. The subjective "feel" for the data or "closeness" to it, which was provided by our qualitative approach, dictated that it would be meaningful and consistent with the objectives of the study to also include two other specific degrees of freedom in our operational definition. Thus, included also were those RCCs which were activated only once but for which plans exist for them to be activated during any such future incident, and those RCCs whose telephones were available to receive rumor calls on a Monday-to-Friday basis.

It was felt by us that to be of use in "crises" times, an RCC must be accessible to potential callers, in terms of being listed in the city's telephone directory. Therefore, our attempt to finalize the universe took the form of consulting the current telephone directories for all cities over 100,000 population. RCCs' listings were sought under six logical headings: "R" for rumor, under emergency phone numbers, and as a sub-listing under Police Department, Human Relations Commission (and its variations, such as Commission on Community Relations), City Government, and County Government. However, this proved unsuccessful because some RCCs which met our criteria for inclusion were so dormant in non-crisis times that they were not even listed in the telephone directory. (Instead, they relied upon the mass media to give broad and frequent exposure to the RCC telephone number when a crisis occurred.)

Therefore, our final attempt to delineate the universe was a one-page questionnaire mailed to the Human Relations Commission in care of the Office of the Mayor in the 126 cities over 100,000 population for which we did not already know that an RCC did exist. In this questionnaire we asked a series of questions designed to determine the existence and activation status of any RCC in that city. We enclosed a stamped, self-addressed return envelope and the response rate was about 44 percent, including ten cities whose RCC met our criteria for inclusion. No follow-up procedure was employed to increase the response rate.

The resulting "sample" of RCCs upon which this study is based therefore includes the entire universe of thirty-six RCCs in cities over 100,000 population,² where the RCCs meet our five criteria concerning activation status and scope of the intended clientele. Descriptive generalizations of the study therefore pertain to this entire universe. However, in formulating a preliminary model of intermittent organizations, our universe of RCCs must be regarded as supplying only suggestive data, since in studying all RCCs we have only sampled one type of intermittent organization.

Finally, before moving on to discuss our sources of data, let us briefly outline the context of the data by describing the nature of the "sample."

About 40 percent of the RCCs in the "sample" (or more correctly, "population") are located in cities ranging in size from 100,000 to 250,000 people, but only half that many RCCs are located in cities whose population size exceeds 750,000. A full two-thirds of the centers are affiliated with municipal Human Relations Commissions, while only two centers were independent. Of these "parent" organizational units about half have a staff size of ten or less (including clericals), while most of the remaining parent organizational units do not have over twenty staff members. And these RCCs are of a sufficiently small scale that, almost without exception, a prolonged and busy activation of the RCC would not result in the suspension of the parent organization's other tasks.

Data Collection and Sources

The Questionnaire

The overwhelming majority of the data was collected by means of an orally administered questionnaire, a copy of the final version of which is included as Appendix A. A pilot questionnaire was formulated, with heavy reliance placed on a pre-tested version of a similar questionnaire used by DRC to study Human Relations Commissions (HRCs).³ This RCC pilot questionnaire was aimed at gathering a thorough descriptive account of RCCs, and was not oriented towards hypothesis testing or model generating of any kind.

Pretest of this questionnaire in two cities suggested that no major changes were necessary. Thus, it was used in eight more cities, after which it became apparent that extensive changes were indeed needed. The instrument was therefore revised and expanded. As the interests of this author were then beginning to crystallize around the possibility of using this study of RCCs to elaborate on the notion of intermittent organizations, some of these changes in the instrument were informed by a reading of Etzioni on intermittent structures. Later additions were made (see the appendix to the questionnaire) based on Pugh et al.'s (1968) discussion of dimensions of organizational structure and Hickson's (1966) discussion of role specificity and role discretion. These latter additions were incorporated in the initial interview for nine RCCs. The data sought in the first revision of the instrument were finally obtained from

eight of the ten RCCs from which it was outstanding through the combined use of further field trips, telephone contact with original respondents, brief mailed questionnaires, and a re-hearing of the original interviews. These same techniques provided data sought in the second revision of the instrument from twenty-four of the twenty-seven RCCs for which it was outstanding.

The questionnaire dealt with the emergence and general background of the RCC, its internal structure (with particular attention devoted to contrasts between dormant and active periods and to contrasts between complex organizations and RCCs), its relationships to other organizations, its operations in crisis and non-crisis times, and finally a few concluding questions were asked about the future of the RCC and its social environment. Excluding the checklists of items on organizational resources, standardization, and formalization, open-ended questions predominated over closed-ended questions by a ratio of about three to two, although many of the open-ended questions were probes to a positive answer on a closed-ended question.

Mode of Data Collection

Most of the questionnaires were administered by the author in a face-to-face tape-recorded interview with the supervisor of the RCC, who served primarily in the role of an informant rather than a respondent.⁴ However, for five RCCs the interviews were conducted by other graduate student DRC staff members who were thoroughly

briefed beforehand on the objectives and techniques of the study. Other staff members also obtained supplementary data in an additional four RCCs. And finally, as mentioned earlier, for five other RCCs located at the geographical extremes of the country and whose existence came belatedly to our attention (after the other DRC field trips had already been conducted there and after our travel funds were depleted), it was necessary to collect the data by long-distance telephone calls and by mailing out a copy of the questionnaire, asking the informant to answer selected important questions.

Entree

Overall our entree into RCCs could be described as excellent. In six of the cities in which the RCC was affiliated with the local HRC, entree was easily gained by pointing out how the RCC study was an extension of DRC's study of HRCs in which the informant had participated earlier. In all cases the RCC supervisor was first contacted by the author by telephone, told about DRC and our study, asked a series of preliminary screening questions from the questionnaire (for purposes of gaining a general understanding of the nature of that particular RCC and determining whether it met our criteria for inclusion in the study), and then asked if he would be willing to speak with the researcher in more detail in person. A date was then arranged for such a visit by the author. In all but one case the informants appeared most willing to participate. The exception here was an RCC supervisor who, convinced that his was the most

sophisticated RCC in the country, felt that he had nothing to gain from participating in the study. The researcher appealed to the sense of duty of the informant by pointing out how the results of the study, when distributed to other cities across the country, might even have the indirect effect of helping to prevent Black casualties in other cities faced with racial tension.⁵ He reluctantly agreed to participate. Fortunately his RCC was large enough that it contained other knowledgeable employees upon whom the researcher was also able to rely for data. Indeed, it was one of only six RCCs in which more than one informant was used.

Interviews

At the beginning of each interview the informant was guaranteed that the information he or she supplied would be kept anonymous and confidential and that the name of the city would not be identified in any research reports. The interviews usually lasted one and one-half to three hours (depending on the degree of activation of the RCC), although one was as short as one hour and another as long as five hours. When the full amount of time needed was not available and if this was known beforehand, a shortened version of the questionnaire was administered. (Priority questions were indicated by one or more asterisks for the benefit of the interviewer.) In many interviews informant fatigue was avoided when the interview would be briefly interrupted by a telephone call, coffee break, or by the informant searching out a document requested by the interviewer.

Other Data Sources

In addition to the administration of the questionnaire, data was sought in other forms. Thus, for each RCC an effort was made to obtain copies of the following: any written reports on the involvement of the RCC in past community "crisis incidents"; samples of forms used to record or log calls received; reports on the daily volume of calls received in non-crisis times; publicity cards, posters, flyers, spot announcements, etc. put out by the RCC; internal and inter-departmental memos and correspondence; editorials, feature articles, or other mass media stories on the RCC; press releases; lists of volunteer workers, their affiliations, and staffing schedule; lists of instructions, rules, and job descriptions for volunteers; standard operating procedures; budgets and budget requests and proposals; plus any other information available in the RCC files (to which we sometimes had unlimited access). In addition, where a meaningful scientific sample could be drawn of the calls received by the RCC, this was done, either by Xeroxing RCC records or by dictating the content of the records into the tape recorder.

These, then, were the sources and types of data which were utilized to tap the various aspects of RCCs themselves. However, the model of intermittent organizations which was eventually examined with this data had as its major independent variable the notion of "environmental turbulence." As a measure of turbulence in the environment of RCCs we used the number of race-related crowd incidents

over a given period of time. The sources of data on this independent variable are discussed below.

The major source was the painstakingly detailed enumeration of "race-related crowd incidents" compiled in the Riot Data Review published by the Riot Data Clearinghouse of the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence for the years 1968 and 1969.⁶ This data is obtained from a monitoring of the New York Times and Washington Post newspapers by the staff of the Lemberg Center, as well as from commercial newspaper clipping services which monitor "a substantial portion of local newspapers across the country," and from other interested organizations such as the U. S. Civil Rights Commission and the Southern Regional Council which made their resources available to the Lemberg Center. Although the Riot Data Clearinghouse points out that such monitoring does not yield infallible indicators, their data is probably the most comprehensive in existence for our needs.

The summary of serious civil disturbances in the published hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Operations (Subcommittee on Investigations) provided data for 1967, as well as providing a cross-validation source for the Lemberg Center data.⁷ These data were supplemented by the detailed data for January to September, 1967, on civil disturbances of all magnitudes (including those which "would not have been classified as 'riots' or received wide press attention without national conditioning to a 'riot climate'"⁸) found in the Report of the National Advisory

Commission on Civil Disorders.⁹ Utilized also were the news clippings on civil disturbances compiled by the Disaster Research Center, as they pertained to the period 1967-1969, the period in which most of our RCCs were formed and in which turbulence in the race relations environment was of sufficient magnitude and proximity to be considered for purposes of examining our model.

Data Analysis

The analysis of data takes both qualitative and quantitative forms in this study. Thus, while on the one hand an "analytic description" is given, on the other hand the data collected in the later stages of the study are brought to bear on a model of intermittent organizations through the use of correlational analysis.

McCall and Simmons define an "analytic description" as an approach which:

(1) employs the concepts, propositions, and empirical generalizations of a body of scientific theory as the basic guides in analysis and reporting, (2) employs thorough and systematic collection, classification, and reporting of facts, and (3) generates new empirical generalizations (and perhaps concepts and propositions as well) based on these data.¹⁰

Thus, in the present analytic description of RCCs a general composite portrayal of the RCC phenomenon is presented, with references to the existing literature on intermittent organizations. The description includes case study analysis as well as an examination of trends across the population.

The final part of the data analysis involves the application of Pearsonian and Spearman correlation techniques to examine the degree of "fit" between the data and the model of intermittent organizations which is derived from general systems theory. But before discussing that theory a brief examination is made below of three methodological issues.

Methodological Issues

Morris Zelditch's discussion¹¹ of the various methods of obtaining different types of information shows how the interviewing of informants can be an efficient (and sometimes the most efficient) way of collecting data for an analytic description. While it is difficult to assess the methodological adequacy, validity, etc. of the qualitative techniques involved in analytic description, the goal of this section will nevertheless be to present an open assessment of these and other related methodological issues.

One methodological issue is the reliability of the data. This refers to the likelihood that the study could be replicated with the same results being achieved. Just as the parent organization (Human Relations Commission) of many RCCs is rapidly changing,¹² so too are some RCCs themselves. Thus, it would be very difficult to replicate the study and obtain the same results.

Related to the issue of reliability is the question of the interaction of the researcher with the data. For instance, in this study reliability was somewhat reduced by the fact that RCC

supervisors often sought (and received) feedback from the researcher concerning other RCCs.¹³ A few indicated that they planned to implement changes based on knowledge derived from the researcher on national trends in RCCs. Two other points at which the researcher interfered with the data were: his joint participation in the organization of a national conference of RCC directors, and a reactive effect of the instrument whereby specific questions posed by the interviewer occasionally stimulated the interviewee to think about (and perhaps act upon) some matter to which he had never previously addressed himself.

The issue of validity is a multi-dimensional one,¹⁴ which can be summarized in terms of the issue of whether the researcher is really measuring what he says he is (internal validity) and the further question of the generalizability of the findings (external validity). Concerning the latter dimension, it is probable that most of those cities who did not respond to the mailed questionnaire (by which an attempt was made to identify the full universe of RCCs) probably did not have an RCC that was in conformity with the operational definition used here. Also, since the study includes the full known universe of RCCs in cities over 100,000 population, the results are, by definition, generalizable to that entire universe. Thus, problems of generalizing to other RCCs involve only those RCCs located in cities under 100,000 population, and no claims are made here about them. Therefore, the only problem of external validity is the extent to which the model of intermittent organizations suggested by data on RCCs can be applied

to other types of intermittent organizations, especially non-crisis types. This is an important question for future research.

Returning to the question of internal validity, the interviewees, almost without exception, could be described as cooperative (often to the extreme). In addition, having been promised a copy of the final report of the study, they themselves served to benefit from giving factual answers to the best of their ability. And furthermore, most of the questionnaire dealt with non-controversial matters. Thus, the question: "How do you know if the informant is telling the truth?"¹⁵ was usually not at issue.

However, there were occasions for which one would have to say that the validity of the data is likely low. These occasions usually correspond to certain recurring points in the questionnaire,¹⁶ for which the informant was less likely to have been in a position to know the information desired, or in which the interviewee was placed in the role of respondent, rather than informant. These areas of lower validity in the questionnaire tended not to involve the organizational structure of the RCC, so they had relatively little effect on the study. And to circumvent the weaknesses and inaccuracies of the interviews, the researcher was often able to refer for further information to the RCC's publications or files or to other persons who had been involved in the RCC in the past. For instance, following the lead of Dean and Whyte¹⁷ the researcher performed such a cross-validation check in the following situation. He suspected that a particular informant's replies were being influenced by a desire on

the part of the latter to please the researcher and make his field trip more "rewarding," by augmenting the salience and complexity of the RCC. The informant answered "About thirty-five" to the important question concerning how many calls are received by the RCC during the average non-crisis month. But when alone with the only person who had responsibility for answering the telephone, the researcher later asked her the same question. She replied that only one call had been received since that organization took over responsibility for the RCC two months previously. Further probes did not result in her changing her answer.

Further interview tactics employed to improve the validity of the data, following Straus et al.,¹⁸ were: (1) the challenge or "devil's advocate" question (challenging the informant to respond to apparent inconsistencies in his replies), and (2) offering interpretations or testing propositions on sophisticated interviewees later in the study.

Thus, while the study is not without its methodological difficulties, it does seem to merit our confidence. In the following chapter the literature relevant to intermittent organizations will be reviewed and a model will be developed to portray crisis-oriented intermittent organizations.

Notes: Chapter II

1. For a discussion of the advantages and limitations of this approach see John P. Dean, Robert L. Eichorn, and Lois R. Dean, "Limitations and Advantages of Unstructured Methods," in Issues in Participant Observation, ed. George McCall and J. L. Simmons (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 19-24.
2. Data from the two RCCs located in cities of less than 100,000 population are excluded from this study for the sake of consistency.
3. See Erwin B. Teuber, "Integrating Mechanisms in a Community Conflict Environment: Human Relations Commissions in Seventeen Cities," (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1972), Appendix B.
4. For an elaboration on this distinction see McCall and Simmons, Participant Observation, pp. 4, 62.
5. This was no fabricated claim. Indeed, one of the rewarding aspects of the study was being able to help RCC supervisors improve their own RCC by passing on to them knowledge of successful ideas and structures in other cities' RCCs.
6. In gathering data on civil disorders, the Riot Data Clearinghouse defines the term as follows: "Civil Disorder refers to incidents involving crowd behavior, characterized by either damage to persons or property and/or defiance of civil authority. More specifically, crowd behavior refers to the activities of four people or more acting in concert." Defiance of civil authority is characterized by one or more of the following: (1) acts of verbal derision; (2) disobedience of the orders of civil authorities; and (3) physical attacks upon such authorities and their "symbolic equivalents."
 The Riot Data Clearinghouse deals only with episodes arising from racial tension as characterized by one or more of the following: (1) saliency of identification of participants with their racial category; (2) motivation of participants by a sense of injustice or hostility towards the out-group; and (3) selectivity of targets of aggression according to their symbolization of racial tensions.
 For a full discussion see Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Riot Data Review 1 (May 1968): 1-3.
7. The subcommittee's criteria for inclusion of a disturbance as a serious civil disorder or major riot were as follows:
 1. a riot-connected death
 or, any two or more of the following:
 2. two or more injuries
 3. sniping

4. looting
5. 20 or more fires
6. 50 or more arrests

See Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Part 13 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), "Appendix: Staff Study of Major Riots and Civil Disorders -- 1965 through July 31, 1968," pp. 2759-2777.

8. Otto Kerner, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 113.
9. Kerner, Report of Commission on Civil Disorders, pp. 158-165.
10. McCall and Simmons, Participant Observation, p. 3.
11. Morris Zelditch, "Some Methodological Problems of Field Studies," in Participant Observation, ed. McCall and Simmons, pp. 5-18 (esp. p. 17).
12. Teuber, "Human Relations Commissions," p. 24.
13. Such feedback was supplied but names of specific cities were withheld from interviewees. By thus guarding the confidentiality of our data we also hoped to reassure the informant that he could speak frankly to us without worry.
14. See, for instance, Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 5-6.
15. See the article by the same title by John P. Dean and William F. Whyte, in Participant Observation, ed. McCall and Simmons, pp. 105-114.
16. Questions which had lower levels of validity were the following: Part I: 5b, 7, 9, 11c; Part III: 2d, f, 3c, d; Part IV: 2; Part V: 3b, c, 7a, 14; and Part VI: 4.
17. Dean and Whyte, p. 108.
18. Anselm Straus et al., "Field Tactics," in Participant Observation, ed. McCall and Simmons, pp. 70-72.

CHAPTER III

A MODEL OF CRISIS-ORIENTED INTERMITTENT ORGANIZATIONS

In this chapter the theoretical groundwork for a model of crisis-oriented intermittent organizations is established by reviewing first its roots in the literature on general systems theory and phase movement theory. Then the major works to explicitly address intermittent organizations -- especially that of Amitai Etzioni in his A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations -- are discussed. Following that, attention is devoted to the application of a slightly revised theory of systems-in-phase-movement to the phenomenon of crisis-oriented intermittent organizations. The model derived from that revision is portrayed diagrammatically and hypotheses from it are presented for testing in the next chapter.

Review of the Literature

As mentioned, the model is taken from general systems theory, particularly as the latter applies to organizations. Two of its most basic premises are that social organizations do exhibit (to varying degrees) characteristics of open systems¹ and that organizational systems do not operate in a social vacuum, but rather are embedded in an environing situation.² This environment may be conceptually

elaborated into sub-environmental systems of which the resource system and the market (clientele) systems are examples.³

Another basic premise is that most organizational environments in modern complex society are characterized by greater or lesser degrees of uncertainty, turbulence, indeterminacy, or change.⁴ Furthermore, organizations in a turbulent environment attempt to reduce the degree of turbulence⁵ and when that turbulence constitutes a threat to the survival of the organization-as-system itself, then open system organizations move to arrest the "entropic" process through counter-processes called "morphogenesis" and "homeostasis."⁶

Now, one consequence of environmental turbulence is an instability or variability in the structure of demands (inputs) placed on the organization from that environmental system. The literature⁷ shows that when the input demands on an open system are unpredictable, then energy, information, and material resources will be stored by that system.⁸ Such stored energy, etc. constitute a form of negative entropy and the conversion and utilization of it in times of entropy crises in the system is a form of morphogenesis. However, due to the high cost of storing human resources, where efficiency is a system goal, human resources are among the first not to be idly stored, if the probability of their infrequent or non-use would be high. Thus, other mechanisms will be utilized to reduce the costs of remaining prepared for incidents of high levels of demand input.

In systems terms, then, the internal organization of an open system acquires (or stores) structural features which permit it to

respond to aspects of the "variety" in its environment. In certain respects it becomes isomorphic with those environmental conditions and the special structural features will be selectively activated in response to changes in those environmental conditions.⁹

Social roles which, in times of entropy crisis in the system "come out of storage" (are activated) relatively quickly but go back into storage again (are de-activated) after a relatively short period of time, have been called "ephemeral roles,"¹⁰ and the structure of these roles, incumbents, and norms is said to be the "emergency performance" subsystem.¹¹ Klonglan et al., following Killian, point out the importance of activities during the dormant or pre-crisis period for understanding both activation and effective performance during the activation period of the emergency performance system.¹²

All of the preceding can be subsumed under the more abstract theoretical formulation of phase movements as developed by Parsons, Bales, and Shils¹³ and Parsons and Smelser.¹⁴ Parsons and Smelser speak of phases as specialization along the "A-G-I-L" dimensions in terms of time sequences of activities. Parsons, Bales, and Shils say:

A "phase" may be regarded as the changing state of the system through some interval in time, when its movement in a given dimension [e.g., adaptive] is maximized relative to its movement in the other three dimensions [e.g., goal attainment, integration, or pattern maintenance].¹⁵

Phases are named in terms of the dimensions toward which there is major movement during that particular time interval. A phase

movement is "a typical sequence of phases in relation to the A-G-I-L dimension in any system."¹⁶

The essence of the Parsonian conceptualization of phase movements is that the system moves from a state of "latency" or "suspension of interaction" through intermediate phases of activity, and back to another period of latency (or what we prefer to call "dormancy"). Parsons et al. posit that the impetus for movement of the sub-system (e.g., the intermittent organization) out of the latency (dormant) phase is provided by mounting system tension (environmental turbulence).¹⁷ Thus, it is evident that the phase movement model can be used as an elaboration of the details of the process of systems morphogenesis in the entropy-crisis situation.

An example of how it can be so used is found in the question of what facilitates the smooth and easy transition of a dormant intermittent organization to a state of activation. Phase movement theory answers this question in terms of characteristics of adjacent phases. That is, not only are phases characterized by (1) a predominant mode of activity (vis-a-vis the A-G-I-L scheme), but they each also are characterized by (2) a particular type of orientation (i.e., either universalism, particularism, quality, or performance) toward objects in the environment, and by (3) a particular type of attitude (i.e., either affectivity, neutrality, specificity, or diffuseness) among the social actors in the subsystem. Phase transitions in general, then, are facilitated, according to phase movement theory, by the fact that there is an overlap in the type of orientation and attitude

which occurs in adjacent phases. Table 2 shows the characteristic features of each phase, including the elements of overlap between adjacent phases. Each phase, then, is characterized by certain values and norms, and according to Parsons et al., there is a transition in which, as the effects of inputs accumulate, the norms and values of the next phase become relevant.¹⁸

TABLE 2
PHASE CHARACTERISTICS ACCORDING TO PARSONS, BALES, AND SHILS*

		Phase			
		Adaptation	Goal Gratification	Integration	Latent Pattern Maintenance
Attitudes	Specificity --- Specificity			Diffuseness --- Diffuseness	
	--Neutrality	Affectivity --- Affectivity			Neutrality--
Orientations	--Universalism	Particularism---Particularism			Universalism--
	Performance --- Performance		Quality --- Quality		
Activities	Adaptive	Instrumental	Integrative	Latent Receptive	
	Instrumental	Expressive	Expressive	Meaning Integra-	
	Object	Consummatory	Sign	tion and Energy	
	Manipulation	Performance & Gratification	Manipulation	Regulation. Tension build-up & drain off.	

* Adapted from Parsons, Bales, and Shils, Working Papers in the Theory of Action (New York: Free Press, 1953), pp. 180-1.

Amitai Etzioni's brief discussion of intermittent organizations in many ways builds directly upon phase movement theory, although he does not directly refer to the work of Parsons, Bales, and Shils. In fact, where he departs from them, he sometimes encounters difficulties. One such example is worth examining. Thus, he tries to distinguish between "seasonal," "shifting," and "intermittent" divisions of compliance within organizations, on the basis of the ratio of organizational activities terminated to those continuously maintained.¹⁹ However, he sometimes fails to make the distinction himself, such as when he refers to summer camps as intermittent, although they are clearly seasonal. Thus, one must ultimately conclude that the differences between seasonal, shifting, and intermittent structures are mainly differences in degree, not kind. Indeed, more careful reading of Parsons et al. would probably not have led Etzioni to make the distinction at all, because the former point out that the concept of shifting system reference points and phase movements apply on the temporal scale as well. For instance, they note that a system such as a family "has its characteristic sequence of phase movements over a single hour" and longer phase movements over a month, etc.²⁰

Etzioni's conceptualization of transition, the role of predictability of the "practical future," reinforcing structures and processes, and the need to maintain the motivational commitment (of lower level participants in the dormant period) seem also to be based on Parsons et al.²¹

Etzioni's contribution is perhaps greatest in his elaboration of the concept reinforcing structures and processes. He notes that reinforcing structures and processes function to maintain the commitment of the lower level participants in the dormant period, in a similar fashion to anticipatory socialization. The most frequently used reinforcing structure, according to him, is the maintenance of an active subunit in the dormant period. He sees this unit as including at least four types of roles: elite roles, clerical roles, maintenance roles, and communication roles.²² Often the activities required for all these roles will occupy only one person part-time, he says.

"Reinforcing processes," as used by Etzioni, are processes which are controlled by the active subunit in the dormant period in order to reinforce the expectation structure and the culture of the intermittent unit.

These processes give intermittent units their unique social characteristics. Without them, each reactivation of an intermittent social unit would be very much like initiating a new social unit.²³

He cites three types of reinforcing processes occurring in the dormant period. They will be discussed in the next chapter.

A small number of other scholars have also written briefly about intermittent organizations and closely related matters. William Friedland and Dorothy Nelkin, for instance, in their article on migrant labor camps as intermittent organizations,²⁴ dispute Etzioni

when they contend that intermittent organizations have no on-going culture, but rather one which has to be re-created (with each activation). In his article on the "transitory-permanence dimension" in organizations,²⁵ Bartolomeo Palisi's main thesis is that the degree of "transitoriness" of an organization affects its structural characteristics. Of particular relevance to the present study is his hypothesis that transitory organizations will tend to have a rather flat, rather than pyramidal, "shape." And finally, Matthew Miles, in his article on "temporary systems,"²⁶ raises an important concept for the study of intermittent organizations. The concept is the "criteria for termination" or de-activation (of an intermittent system), of which he specifies three types.

The next section, then, will put forth a model based upon the foregoing theoretical foundations.

Presentation of the Model

The discursive model of crisis-oriented intermittent organizations presented here is a phase-movement model of social systems and subsystems. It will be applied to, and illustrated by, rumor control centers.

The central theoretical hypothesis is that the initial creation of rumor control centers -- i.e., their initial differentiation as a subsystem out of a larger system -- represents an adaptive response by that larger system to turbulence in its own external environment. Furthermore, each activation or mobilization of the RCC is also to be

seen as an adaptive response of the parent organization-as-system to environmental turbulence, and this adaptive response takes the form of a phase movement from a stage of latency (dormancy) through intermediate stages back to a state of latency. This is consistent with the Parsonian formulation of phase movement theory, according to which there is no one-to-one correspondence between the phase in which the larger system is at any given point in time, and the phase in which its constituent units are at that same point in time.

The data on RCCs do suggest some revisions in the Parsonian model. Thus, while Parsons et al. refer to the goal attainment phase as involving "intrinsically gratifying activity" and conceptualize it as the culminating phase of a sequence of preparatory activities,²⁷ the data at hand lead to a different formulation. For purposes of crisis-oriented intermittent organizations, then, it is more useful to conceive of it as the period in which, on the basis of the preparations made in the adaptive phase, the differentiated subsystem (intermittent organization) pursues those goals whose eventual achievement constitutes the subsystem's primary functional contribution to the larger system. Thus, this period is marked by the transformation of raw material inputs and their output as organizational products. For RCCs it involves obtaining information, interpreting it, and answering questions.

The latency (dormant) phase is one in which the fundamental system problem is that of maintaining the cultural pattern of the system and motivational commitments of the participants. It is this

phase which is lacking in the emergent groups studied by Forrest, in that they lacked mechanisms to guarantee their own continuity ("pattern maintenance") during the period between crises. Parsons et al. note that the latency stage involves not only the suspension of interaction, but, under certain (unspecified) conditions, the expression of the cultural patterns and motivational commitments. We would suggest that for subsystems whose primary function is to respond to entropy crises in the system's environment and which are accordingly fully differentiated from a larger parent organization-as-system only at such times, the integration phase will occur primarily during such latent phases when the cultural patterns and motivational commitments are expressed. (An exception to this proposition would be the case of the intermittent unit for which the duration of activation is prolonged.)

Given the problems which such a temporal placement of the integration process occasions for the integration of the system, we would anticipate the existence of structural mechanisms in well-integrated intermittent systems, in order to counteract these problems. The mechanisms of role carryover and the importation or "borrowing" of other interactional, structural, and procedural patterns would seem to have the effect of providing some such integration in the goal attainment phase.²⁸

Thus, while Parsons et al. suggest that phase movements will generally take the form

L - A - G - I - L,

it is suggested here that for phase movements which occur in response

to entropy crises, the sequence is more likely to take the form

L - A - G - R - L - I - L,

where "R" represents a period of transition in which the intermittent subsystem is collapsed and reincorporated into the parent organization-as-system. Table 3 portrays this new conceptualization of the phase movement process, in terms of the temporal order of the phases and the internal processes characteristic of each phase.

Figure 1 is a diagrammatic portrayal of our model. It begins with environmental turbulence (T_1) which is perceived by social actors as threatening the order of the system (an "entropy crisis"). Their perceptions constitute negative feedback from the environment. Their reaction is to place demands on system units who have the capability to mitigate the turbulence. These turbulence mitigating units are such organizations as the police department or the parent organization of a rumor control center, when T_1 is the racial relations environment. (Participation in the rumor process may also represent an attempt to mitigate the turbulence -- "define the situation" -- but sometimes has an entropic, or turbulence exacerbating, effect.)

The increase in demands placed on these turbulence mitigating units of the system, if of sufficient magnitude, in turn constitutes turbulence in the environment of these units which we now in turn view as subsystems. They try to reduce or eliminate this turbulence in demands by acting in a morphogenic fashion on the turbulence (T_1) which initiated the cycle. However, if their current internal structure is not isomorphic with that which they need to counter the


TABLE 3

ACTIVITIES IN THE PHASES OF INTERMITTENT ORGANIZATIONS

Phase	Adaptation-Differentiation Transition	Goal Attainment	Reinforcement Transition	Latency	Integration	Latency	
Activities	<p>1. Accessing & mobilizing resources and raw material.</p> <p>2. Opening of channels of access from clientele sub-environment.</p> <p>3. Structural, normative, & technological elaboration.</p> <p>4. Retrieval of stored information.</p>	<p>1. Receiving, processing, & output of raw materials as the primary function of the unit.</p> <p>2. Utilization of role carry-over imported structures, procedures, & interaction modes.</p> <p>3. Testing for criteria of termination.</p>	<p>1. Dispersal of participants.</p> <p>2. Closing or limiting of channels of access from clientele sub-environment.</p> <p>3. Collapsing of emergency performance normative & technological structures.</p> <p>4. Storage of information.</p>	<p>1. Enactment of reinforcing roles.</p> <p>2. Performance of secondary functions.</p> <p>3. Exercise of limitations on commitments of participants to other systems.</p> <p>4. Monitoring & mapping of environment of larger system for activation cues.</p>	<p>1. Reinforcing processes.</p> <p>2. Expression of cultural patterns of, & motivation- al commitments to the inter- mittent organiza- tion.</p> <p>3. Exercise of limitations on commitments of participants to other systems.</p> <p>4. Monitoring & mapping of environment of larger system for activation cues.</p>	<p>1. Enactment of reinforcing roles.</p> <p>2. Performance of secondary functions.</p> <p>3. Exercise of limitations on commitments of participants to other systems.</p> <p>4. Monitoring & mapping of environment of larger system for activation cues.</p>	<p>1. Enactment of reinforcing roles.</p> <p>2. Performance of secondary functions.</p> <p>3. Exercise of limitations on commitments of participants to other systems.</p> <p>4. Monitoring & mapping of environment of larger system for activation cues.</p>

FIGURE 1

A SYSTEMS MODEL OF INTERMITTENT ORGANIZATIONS



turbulence in demands, then they adapt by differentiating out ("activating") a structurally and functionally specialized subsystem which we call an intermittent organizational unit. Viewing this intermittent organizational unit in turn as a subsystem, the demands placed upon it by its parent organization can be seen to constitute turbulence. The morphogenic response of this subsystem, in the case of rumor control centers, is directed not at turbulence T_1 , but instead at the societal reaction which created the turbulence for its parent organization, according to the functional specialization of the intermittent unit. (Note that very few of the RCCs had goals which focused on the state of race relations in general, but rather had such goals as alleviation of psychological fears and anxieties, and preventing the spread of rumors.) Thus, the intermittent organizational subsystem serves as a buffer or gatekeeper for its parent organization as it applies itself to meeting the demands which would otherwise have to be met by the parent organization. Its phase movement, in terms of its adaptation processes, goal attainment, and reincorporation as a latent structure in the parent organization-as-system, are outlined in Table 3 and illustrated for RCCs at the end of the next chapter, as are the processes involved in its integrative and latent phases.

Although models such as this are designed not to be tested, but to bring order and meaning to reality,²⁹ hypotheses can be derived from the model. The results of the tests of those hypotheses help us to assess the "goodness of fit" of the model to reality. Six such hypotheses are presented below.

Since the RCC's parent organization has as its primary system function the improvement of race relations, the most relevant type of turbulence for the differentiation of RCCs (as a functionally specialized subsystem) is turbulence in the race relations environment (T_1). Since the model indicates that in order for the system to be isomorphic with its environment, an increase in environmental turbulence will lead to an increase in differentiation of the impacted system, we would hypothesize that:

Hypothesis I: The greater the degree of turbulence in the race relations environment, the greater the degree of differentiation of the intermittent unit (RCC) from its parent organization-as-system.

"Differentiation" refers in this hypothesis to such dichotomous features of the intermittent unit as having or not having a separate budget, a separate organizational chart, and a separate identity (e.g., the telephone of the RCC being answered using the name of the RCC rather than the name of the parent organization).

Although an intermittent organization may have a separate budget, authority structure, and identity, these are themselves variables which are capable of further elaboration. Since differentiation indirectly refers to complexity, one is also led by the model to hypothesize that:

Hypothesis II: The greater the degree of turbulence in the race relations environment, the greater the degree of structural complexity of the intermittent unit (RCC).

"Structural complexity," as used here, refers to such features of the intermittent unit as the number of levels in its hierarchy, its degree of division of labor, size, and its technological base.

The model specifies mobilization of resources as being an activity in the adaptation phase of the intermittent system unit, and personnel are considered to be one such resource. Thus, the model suggests that:

Hypothesis III: The greater the degree of turbulence in the race relations environment, the greater the staff size of the intermittent unit (RCC).

Furthermore, since the model specifies normative elaboration as being an activity in the adaptation phase, one is led to hypothesize that:

Hypothesis IV: The greater the degree of turbulence in the race relations environment, the greater the degree of formalization of the intermittent unit (RCC).

"Formalization," as a systems concept, refers, in abstract terms, to the degree of constraint imposed upon social actors, and is measured here in terms of such features of the intermittent unit as the existence of a table of organization showing lines of authority, the formalization of role definitions, and the formalization of the recording of incumbents' role performance.

But for these relationships to come about, the model suggests that there will be an intervening (linear, positive) relationship between the degree of environmental turbulence (T_1) and the amount of

demands placed on the parent organization of the intermittent unit. Since the model regards the intermittent unit as being differentiated to receive these demands in place of the parent organization, one may hypothesize that:

Hypothesis V: The greater the degree of turbulence in the race relations environment, the greater the volume of demands placed on the intermittent unit (RCC).

And since these demands constitute environmental turbulence to which the intermittent unit-as-system must respond, the model hypothesizes that it will do so by elaborating its internal structure. For instance, it hypothesizes that:

Hypothesis VI: The greater the volume of demands placed on the intermittent unit (RCC), the greater its structural complexity.³⁰

In these latter two hypotheses, the volume of demands placed on the intermittent RCC is measured in terms of the number of calls received by the RCC from the public.

The following chapter examines how the data on RCCs relate to the literature on intermittent organizations, including the model presented in this chapter, and a test is made of the six hypotheses above.

Notes: Chapter III

1. As Walter Buckley points out, a neat distinction cannot be made between those things that are, and those that are not, systems. Rather, we must recognize varying degrees of systemness. Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 42.
2. Talcott Parsons, Robert Bales, and Edward Shils, Working Papers in the Theory of Action (New York: Free Press, 1953), p. 174.
3. Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, "Differentiation and Integration in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (June 1967): 1-47.
4. See Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970); F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments," in Complex Organizations and their Environments, ed. M. B. Brinkerhoff and P. R. Kunz (Dubuque: W. C. Brown, 1972), pp. 268-281; and Shirley Terreberry, "The Evolution of Organizational Environments," Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (March 1968): 590-613.
5. Rolf P. Lynton, "Linking an Innovative Subsystem into the System," Administrative Science Quarterly 14 (September 1969): 398-416.
6. Buckley, Sociology Systems Theory, chap. 1.
7. Selwyn Becker and Gerald Gordon, "An Entrepreneurial Theory of Formal Organizations. Part I. Patterns of Formal Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 11 (December 1966): 315-344.
8. This property of an organization is referred to as structural elasticity, flexibility, or to use Rosner's term, "organizational slack." See Martin Rosner, "Economic Determinants of Organizational Innovation," Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (1968): 614-625.
9. Buckley, Sociology Systems Theory, p. 63.
10. For the origin of the term "ephemeral role" as used in this context, see Alvin L. Bertrand, Social Organization (Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Co., 1972), pp. 73-74, cited in Gerald Klomglan, et al., "The Enactment of Ephemeral Roles in Disaster," Journal Paper No. J-7474 (Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experimental Station, Ames, Iowa, 1972).

11. The term "emergency performance structure" is from Thomas Drabek, "A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Organizational Stress (Unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, University of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, n.d.)."
12. Klonglan et al., "Ephemeral Roles in Disaster."
13. Parsons, Bales, and Shils, Working Papers, chap. 5, "Phase Movement in Relation to Motivation, Symbol Formation, and Role Structure," pp. 179-190, "Phases as Related to Pattern Variables."
14. Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser, Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 242-244.
15. Parsons, Bales, and Shils, Working Papers, p. 181.
16. Parsons and Smelser, Economy and Society, p. 242.
17. Parsons, Bales, and Shils, Working Papers, p. 225.
18. Parsons, Bales, and Shils, Working Papers, p. 202.
19. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement, and their Correlates (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 283.
20. Parsons, Bales, and Shils, Working Papers, p. 178.
21. The page references in Etzioni, Comparative Analysis followed by page references in Parsons, Bales, and Shils, Working Papers are 285 (185), 286 (183), 290 (205-6), and 290 (185), respectively.
22. Etzioni, Comparative Analysis, p. 290.
23. Etzioni, Comparative Analysis, pp. 291-292.
24. William H. Friedland and Dorothy Nelkin, "Migrant Labor as a Form of Intermittent Social Organization and as a Channel of Geographic Mobility" (New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, May 1967), esp. pp. 46-50.
25. Bartolomeo Palisi, "Some Suggestions About the Transitory-Permanence Dimension of Organizations," British Journal of Sociology 21 (1970): 200-206.
26. Matthew Miles, "On Temporary Systems," in Innovation in Education, ed. Matthew Miles (New York: Teacher's College, Columbia University, 1964), chap. 19.

27. Parsons, Bales, and Shils, Working Papers, p. 184.
28. Thomas Forrest, "Structural Differentiation in Emergent Groups," (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1972), pp. 91-97, and also William Form and Sigmund Nosow, Community in Disaster (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 257.
29. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), chap. 7.
30. The model likewise leads one to hypothesize the existence of a similar relationship between volume of demands on the intermittent unit and its degree of differentiation and formalization. However, due to limitations of the data in the current study, these hypotheses will not be presented for statistical analysis. These limitations are the low range of possible variability on the differentiation and formalization indices, and the ordinal level measurement which we adopted due to the low reliability of answers to the question concerning the number of calls received.

CHAPTER IV

DATA ANALYSIS

Introduction

In combining the qualitative and quantitative approaches, this analytical chapter reflects the methodological evolution of the overall study. The purpose will be two-fold: to present an analytic description of one type of crisis-oriented intermittent organization -- the rumor control center -- and to examine the model presented in the previous chapter. The chapter begins with a case study of an RCC. The analytic description continues with a brief historical overview and then a consideration of the effect of four types of variables (geographical, political, demographic, and social) on when RCCs emerged. There follows an account of selected aspects of the relationships of RCCs with their external environment: to wit, their goals, clientele, and inter-organizational relationships. Then, considerable attention is devoted to various aspects of their internal structure and processes, particularly their relation to the literature on the structure and processes of intermittent organizations. Attention here is focused on Etzioni's reinforcing structures and processes, structural mechanisms of integration, the structural expansion (in terms of staff size and number of hierarchical levels) of the

activation transition, and the degree of differentiation of the intermittent unit from its parent organization. For the latter variable and two others -- structural complexity and formalization -- which are also highlighted in the model in Chapter III, an item-by-item composite index is presented, along with a table showing the frequency distribution of the population scores for each index. The chapter concludes with a statistical test of the six hypotheses derived from the model and a discussion of how the phase movement model as a whole applies to rumor control centers.

Case Study¹

The presentation of this case study is intended to provide a further grounding of the vehicle of analysis, rumor control centers, for readers who are unfamiliar with RCCs. It adds perspective by bringing together in one concrete example many of the variables which are addressed separately in subsequent portions of the chapter. Attention will thus be focused in turn on its emergence; its goals, clientele, and relations with other organizations; its activeness; its internal structural features; and finally its supervisor's view of its effectiveness and prospects for the future.

The center to be described occupies an intermediate position on the spectrum of structural variability among RCCs. That is, there exist centers which are more active, formalized, complexly structured, separate from their parent organization, and bigger in staff size. But there are others which approach virtual dormancy during non-crisis

times, and which show less development along the above dimensions. The Tridon² RCC represents those centers which fall between these two extremes. Tridon itself is a large industrial city in the northern mid-west, with a black/white population ratio of .80. Its rumor control center, established in March 1968 as one of the first few in the country, is affiliated with the municipal Department of Human Relations. Its emergence stemmed directly from a polarization of the community due to the proliferation of inflammatory rumors which were anticipating a repeat of the violence of the previous summer. (These rumors happened to arise during a prolonged newspaper strike.) Created prior to the issuance of the report of the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, it was initiated by the mayor and encountered no other opposition to its creation. The only socialization its staff members had was in the form of advice from the local chapter of the Anti-Defamation League. However, it later did enter a network of socialization at the national level as a source of expertise, having received over 7300 calls over a ten day period at the time of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. And at least a dozen representatives from other cities sought information from its staff concerning how to establish and operate one.

The Center was established by executive order of the mayor and so, like about two thirds of the remainder of the population, has terms of reference formalized in writing. Its purpose is simple -- "to be responsible for the collection, evaluation, and countering of rumors which could lead to civil disorder." However, it has evolved

through a process of definition by the public in non-crisis times, into a general information, referral, and complaint service, a function which is compatible with that of its parent organization. Its clientele in non-crisis times is estimated to be eighty percent white, suburban, female, although in crisis times the percentage of white callers is estimated to drop to about sixty. The opinion was expressed by the supervisor that Blacks tend not to trust the RCC due to identifying it with the parent organization, which is a part of city government.

The external organizations with which the Tridon RCC most frequently interacts locally are the police department (especially the local precincts and the communications, public information, and homicide divisions), the board of education (especially the security division), and the mass media, in that order of frequency. Other important organizations with which the RCC deals include neighborhood groups, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the state civil rights commission. Despite the fact that the RCC is a part of city government responsible to the mayor (through the head of the parent organizations) and reported having contact with the mayor's office during times of crisis, the new mayor himself was said to have only marginal awareness of the RCC.

The relationship with the police department is somewhat strained. Although there is a direct, no-dial telephone linkage between the two and although the RCC does send a liaison person to the police department during crisis times, the staff of the RCC does sometimes

experience considerable difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of the police, particularly when the latter feel "threatened." The balance of affective statements made by the RCC staff throughout the course of the interview was, accordingly, rather negative. For instance, staff members remarked to the interviewer:

They [the police] dislike us a great deal. It's almost an adversary situation.

During the shoot-out incident at the church I was very restricted in what I could say over the phone while I was [liaison man] at police headquarters. They wouldn't give me any information.

We have to fake the police out a bit.

The researcher was also told that the police have a monitor on the office telephone of the staff, and that RCC staff members have been attacked and denied access to certain areas during racial incidents, despite carrying identification with them.

Moving on to a consideration of the extent to which this center is active or dormant, and using several indicators of that variable, the center can be characterized as slightly less dormant than the population as a whole. Thus, although it receives about three or four calls per week, its phones are answered in non-crisis times giving only the name of the parent organization, "except when calls seem so frequent (over five per hour) that convenience would dictate answering 'Rumor Control'." The phones are listed in three places in the telephone directory and the staff consists of four professional staff members of the parent organization who are all involved part-time

with rumor control, but only to the extent that they have responsibility for answering the "rumor phone" on those infrequent occasions when it rings. In the parent organization one of these persons is the supervisor of the other three and this pattern of authority holds true vis-a-vis the RCC.

As for crisis activations, it has a history which includes several periods of peaks in demand concomitant with the following instances of environmental turbulence: the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in April 1968 and the first anniversary of that event, the first anniversary of Tridon's July 1967 civil disorder, an inter-racial shoot-out in April 1969 (activation at a higher than normal level for two weeks) and many school walkouts that same spring, a lumberyard fire the following spring from which the smoke was defined in the rumor process as resulting from ghetto rioting, and then a lull in its activity until the summer of 1972 when calls increased due to the possibility of racial bussing being ordered for the schools that fall.

As for internal structural characteristics, the organization of the center shifts from having two formally designated positions (supervisor and "staff") in non-crisis times to having six in these "crisis" times -- an increase of four positions. The six positions in crisis times are the following: supervisor, answerers, verifiers, external liaison, field representative, and clerk. The increase in staff to fill these positions would be, at the maximum, from four part-time persons to sixteen full-time persons per shift,

which is about half again as large as the average maximum crisis-time size for the RCC population as a whole. There is no increase, though, in the number of levels of authority. In fact, the crisis-time structure of authority was portrayed by the main informant as a hub and spoke pattern rather than as a hierarchy per se. Such a relative lack of authority differentiation is common to most RCCs whose telephones are answered by the professional staff of the parent organization.

Tridon's center is somewhat above the average in its degree of differentiation from its parent organization. The fact that it does possess an organizational chart, is listed separately (under "R" for Rumor Control) from its parent organization in the telephone directory, and does have a separate staff assigned to it (as opposed to everyone in the parent organization having responsibilities in RCC) would give it a score of 3 out of a possible 5 on the index of differentiation shown later in this chapter on page 81.

Tridon's RCC has a simpler structure than most other RCCs. Its division of labor, for instance, no longer includes the role of weekend or night-time telephone answerer since the police department ceased in this role. It does have a maximum staff size of sixteen persons per shift in a crisis, but has no separate budget, only two levels to its structure, and has only three of the five pieces of equipment which can be used as indicators of the technological component of structural complexity. So in the quantitative terms of the index of structural complexity on page 87, then, this center

would receive a score of 4 out of a possible 11, compared to the population mean score of 5.5.

Although the organization is not very complex, it is somewhat formalized. On the index of formalization on page 85, it received half points on formalization of organizational identity, half points on formalization in the recording of role performance, and it does have written policies and rules (formalization of role definition). This gives it a score of 3 out of 5, which is the population mean.

Given this history and these structural features, what can be said about the effectiveness and future prospects of Tridon's RCC? When asked if the center had ever unintentionally contributed to a heightening of tensions in the community, one of the staff members was of the opinion that, "Inevitably it has to. People's selective perception screens out some of what we say." However, he was also able to identify at least one situation in which he felt the RCC was instrumental in preventing an incident from erupting into a civil disorder despite the incident's potential explosiveness. His personal evaluation, lacking any environmental feedback, was that the center probably has its greatest influence on the callers themselves (rather than on persons in their social network) and was probably successful in "knocking out a certain percentage of rumors" as the quality of the information dispensed by the RCC would "hopefully . . . last for a few tellings." But in June 1973, nine months having elapsed since the last major peaking in demands (calls received), his prognosis for the center was that it would "slowly fade out unless there is a major crisis need."

Emergence

Rumor Control Centers can be found in several different countries and in different forms across time within the same country.³ But only in the United States has the author been able to identify RCCs which take the form of intermittent organizations.

The first of the current American RCCs appeared in Los Angeles in April 1967.⁴ Called the Watts Communicator, it is said to have handled in excess of 10,000 calls in its first week of operation. But it apparently went out of existence and what was to become the prototype model emerged independently in Chicago on July 26, 1967 to combat the multitude of rumors in Chicago during the civil disorders occurring at that time in Milwaukee and Detroit.⁵ The President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the "Kerner Commission") cited Chicago's RCC for its role in preventing the outbreak of civil disorder in that city. The commission noted the significant role played by rumors during times of community tension and recommended that other cities establish rumor control units such as Chicago's. (Four of our cities had already established one prior to publication of the commission's report.) This recommendation was a very influential factor as a keynoting event in the "movement" to establish RCCs in the United States. For instance, about three-quarters of the remaining twenty RCC supervisors to whom the question was posed, said that this "Kerner Commission" recommendation was either the source (6 cases) of the idea of an RCC for them or that the Kerner Report served to legitimate (8 cases) to local politicians an idea or plan

for an RCC which they already had themselves. A major agent of socialization and institutionalization in the movement was a seminar on the "value" and technique of establishing and operating an RCC, given at Chicago's center in late June of 1968 for representatives from ninety cities.⁶

Extensive networks of communication were involved in the initial socialization process. When asked what sources of information they had in learning how to set up and operate an RCC, only four of thirty who replied indicated that they were exempt from these networks. For instance, thirteen engaged in written correspondence, mainly with one of the three sociometric "stars" of the network; twelve made site visits to other RCCs; and eleven were in attendance at the Chicago seminar. Almost half of those replying used more than one of these approaches. And only two reported that they themselves had not been contacted by representatives from any other RCC seeking information concerning how their's works.

Almost two thirds of the RCCs in the population were established before 1969. Thus, by the time of the Chicago seminar, twelve of our cities had already established their center. Another ten followed before the end of 1968, while 1969 witnessed a drop-off with only two being established that year. However, there was a resurgence of seven in 1970 and a total of five in 1971-1972.

Statistically speaking, what might account for this distribution over five years? An examination of the correlates of the date of origin for each RCC provides some insight here.

Table 4 shows the geographical distribution of our population of RCCs along with the median rank of the date of origin across all RCCs in each respective region. The mid-west cities clearly tended to lead the way in the establishment of centers,⁷ while southern cities predominated among those last to adopt the innovation. Northern and western cities were intermediate.

TABLE 4

RUMOR CONTROL CENTERS BY REGION AND MEDIAN RANK OF DATE OF ORIGIN

Region	Number of Cities Having an RCC	Median Rank of Date of Origin of RCCs in Each Region
Mid-west	9	6.5
West	10	14.5
North	10	24.5
South	7	30.0

The influence of political variables upon when (or whether) the RCC is established is unclear. On the one hand we are aware of cases, necessarily excluded from this study, where local politicians prevented the appropriation of funds to establish and operate an RCC. But on the other hand, almost four-fifths of those asked (N=27) reported no opposition to the creation of the RCC.⁸ And the nature of the political structure, in terms of mayor versus manager form of government, made no appreciable difference in the median rank of date of origin of RCCs, as shown by scores of 17.5 and 19.5 for the mayor

and manager, respectively. But when the type of parent organization with which the RCC is affiliated is considered, it is seen that the median rank of date of origin for those affiliated with Human Relations Commissions is about 16, while the remaining twelve centers with any other affiliation have a median rank of 25.5.

The effect of demographic variables on date of origin of RCCs is minimal. For instance, we might expect that larger cities (in our truncated population of cities over 100,000 people) would tend to establish RCCs earlier than smaller cities. While the predicted direction of the relationship holds true in the data, the strength of the relationship is not statistically significant at the 5 percent level for a Chi-squared test.⁹ Even if city size is decomposed into the number of whites and non-whites, the Chi-squared value for the relationship between this ratio (of non-whites to whites) and date of origin is still not statistically significant at the 5 percent level.¹⁰

A causally more proximate factor bearing on when RCCs emerged is the amount of turbulence in the racial environment. The model developed in Chapter III suggests that the initial formation or differentiation of RCCs out of a parent organization will occur during a time of entropy crisis or severe turbulence in the parent organization's environment. The data on date of emergence of RCCs lend support to such a hypothesis when turbulence in the racial environment is tapped in terms of perceived intensification of local rumor activity and the actual outbreak of civil disturbances. Thus, in response to a direct question asking what specific circumstances in the local community

led to the establishment of their RCC, one third of the RCC supervisors reported that theirs was established during local civil disturbances; another 19 percent reported theirs to have been established immediately after a local civil disturbance; and another third cited the intensification of local rumors and tensions. The remaining 14 percent cited other factors.

External Relations: Goals, Clientele,
and Interorganizational Relationships

With the above as background, this section proceeds to discuss several aspects of the relationship between RCCs and their environment: their goals (or societal functions), who their clientele is, and the types of outside organizations with which they interact.

Almost all the centers studied shared the same official purpose: to investigate rumors and to gather and disseminate accurate information so as to stop rumors. Variations or elaborations on this included alleviating the fears and anxieties of callers, providing factual information which is unrelated to rumors (e.g., about bus rerouting) during time of racial disorder, monitoring race relations so as to serve as a "barometer" for community tensions, or even simply to reduce the volume of traffic through the switchboards of other city government offices. In summary, then, each RCC was designed to fulfill one or more of the following functions: social control, mediation (between citizens and city government), facilitation (of the tasks of other emergency organizations through decreasing the volume of demands

made upon them), and provision of psychological relief to individual callers.

Informally, however, any given RCC usually performs functions other than those formally charted. The most common of these is serving as a general information and referral service in non-crisis times. A psychological scapegoating function usually also emerges where it had not been intended beforehand, as callers vent their feelings on the staff answerers rather than on the "opposing" racial or ethnic group.

The wide variety of functions fulfilled by RCCs is suggested by the content of the calls received. The relative frequency of any given type of call varies between cities, but the following are common types: sports and entertainment inquiries and Hollywood "gossip" calls; inquiries about the local economy (e.g., "Is 'X' company really pulling out of town? My husband works there."); calls about impending minority confrontations (e.g., "My housekeeper said there's going to be trouble this weekend. Is it true?"); calls about racial disturbances in the high schools (e.g., "What happened at 'X' school today, and is it safe to send my children to school tomorrow?"); inquiries about curfew technicalities and about transportation routes during civil disturbances; volunteered information (e.g., "There's a crowd of toughs forming at the corner of 'X' and 'Y' streets."); inquiries about the who, what, where, how, and so on of interracial incidents; complaints or inquiries concerning local, state, or federal

government; and even consumer protection calls (e.g., "What brand of green beans was recalled by the government yesterday?").

The clientele of RCCs also varies somewhat from one city to another. However, obtaining accurate data on clientele is difficult for several reasons. First, dispensing with record-keeping is one way in which crisis-oriented organizations reduce their ratio of demands received to capability of meeting those demands, and this did indeed happen in many RCCs to one degree or another. Lacking these records, the researcher must therefore rely on the memory of informants, for data on RCCs' clientele. And since, in an allegedly universalistic society, explicitly inquiring about the dominant or minority group status of the caller is considered a violation of norms of politeness, the informants had, in turn, to rely upon several indirect indicators which were of varying degrees of reliability. Some of these indicators of the callers' minority or dominant status which were utilized by RCC personnel were: the accent of the caller, the address or telephone exchange of the caller, and even the content of the call.

Recognizing these limitations, the data on RCCs' clientele were treated in general, qualitative terms. This permitted classification of twenty-eight cities according to whether they were, or had become, oriented (in terms of providing services) towards a crisis-time clientele comprised mainly of minority group members (N=3), dominant group members (N=23), or minority and dominant group members in approximately equal proportions (N=2). These data on the overwhelming

number of RCCs oriented primarily to a white clientele, along with our knowledge of the scapegoating, cathartic, and inter-racial mediating functions fulfilled by RCCs, suggest that most RCCs seem to function to inhibit the classic inter-racial type of riot which characterized the 1940's and earlier. This is an unanticipated consequence quite different from the intent of the recommendation in the Kerner Commission's report that RCCs be established to prevent the type of riot where Blacks primarily attack property but not persons, which was the pattern of the 1960's. This type of unanticipated consequence can be seen in the often-cited example wherein the RCC calms a caller who wants to know if it is true that Blacks attacked some whites, so he can take retaliatory actions if it is true.

Turning now to organizations, rather than individuals, with which the RCCs interact, most RCCs can be characterized as involved in exchanges with about six other organizations. Of these, the most frequently and virtually universally mentioned is, as might be anticipated, the police department, which supplies a "raw material" (information) to the RCC to be processed. An extreme example of relations with the police department, representing a quite different experience from that of Tridon cited earlier, is provided by one informant who went so far as to offer:

We are sort of a team as far as the Police Department is concerned. That is, we are not trying to fight them, contradict, discredit [them or] support people who are biased about the activity of the Police Department. . . . For some hard-to-explain reason I would consider this type of an operation [an RCC] as being akin to police more than being on the other side.

Another summarized the activities of his center as follows:

Here in [name of city_] what our Center boils down to is mediating between the police and the citizens.

The second most frequently cited organization is to be expected on the basis of Table 3. This "organization" is the mass media, taken collectively. As suggested in Table 3, one of the standard procedures in activating the dormant intermittent unit is to contact the mass media so that they can (re)socialize the public as to the identity, function, and availability of this often newly salient component of the community's social environment. Furthermore, the media have the ability to bestow a certain degree of legitimacy upon an intermittent organization by featuring it in news stories (as was done in most cities) and by providing free advertising to relieve the strain on a budget which is typically meager. It is also interesting to note that in one community a radio station is the parent organization of the RCC, while in another a local newspaper funded the center from 1967 to 1971.

The third most frequently mentioned organization with which RCCs interact is the office of the mayor or city manager. The remaining members of the typical circle of organizations in which RCCs are involved are the Board of Education (or individual schools) when disturbances or integration programs occurred there, human relations organizations (such as Urban League, NAACP, etc.), and the fire department. Other organizations cited only one or a few times in the study include the telephone and local transit companies; municipal

departments of welfare, housing, and public works; sheriff, state police, and FBI; Civil Defense; legal aid; churches; private industry (especially concerning rumors of impending strikes, layoffs, or pull-outs); and others.

Internal Structure

An analytic description, as outlined earlier in the quotation from McCall and Simmons, uses as a basic guide the concepts, propositions, and empirical generalizations of a body of scientific theory. In the present study, precisely such use was made of the writings of Etzioni and others on intermittent organizations and related phenomena. It is the purpose of this section of the chapter to report on how the RCC data relate to that literature and then to present a series of tables which further describe important structural features of RCCs and introduce the quantitative assessment of the model presented in the previous chapter.

Etzioni has written that intermittent structures utilize various reinforcing sub-structures and processes to maintain the commitment of their lower level participants in the dormant period. The data on rumor control centers lend only partial support to this generalization. For instance, Etzioni contends that the maintenance of an active sub-unit is the most frequently used "reinforcing structure." However, a full third of the thirty-six RCCs had no staff whatsoever during non-crisis times, while only one sixth of the RCCs had the equivalent of

one or more full-time persons on staff per eight-hour shift in these times.

Since the motivational commitment of the lower level participants in RCCs is not, in general, maintained by means of keeping a full-time active sub-unit or core staff, one might anticipate that other aspects of the RCC would be emphasized so that the lower level participants could identify with it during the dormant phase. However, this seems not to be the case, since almost a third of the centers are not even listed in the telephone directory. Furthermore, if a volunteer staff member were to telephone the RCC during non-crisis times, in only slightly more than half of the RCC cities would the answering organization even answer by identifying itself as the RCC (as opposed to identifying itself as the parent organization).

One specific reinforcing structure which Etzioni suggests is that of the clerical role. This is the most frequent role found in RCCs during the dormant phase. However, the responsibilities of the clerical role are not as elaborate in RCCs as they are in Etzioni's description. For instance, he maintains that the clerks carry out the paper work which permits analysis of the intermittent unit's performance during the active period. Yet, such feedback processes could be found in less than 10 percent of the RCCs. His contention that clerks maintain the documents in which the formal structure of the unit is recorded, including its formal allocation of tasks, lines of communication, etc., is called into question by the facts that twenty-one of the thirty-two RCCs for which data on this were available did not in

fact have a written table of organization and about one third of the centers did not have a written charter or statement of purpose.

From the foregoing, then, one can conclude that two important variables which Etzioni has neglected to take into consideration are the size of the intermittent organizations and its degree of formalization, including the formalization of its identity.

Etzioni also says that the facilities and equipment of the intermittent organizational unit must usually be maintained during the dormant phase, thereby giving rise to the maintenance role as a part of the reinforcing structure. But the technology of RCCs is so simple that such a role is not needed in them. This suggests that the technology of the intermittent organization is an important variable influencing the nature of activities during the dormant phase. Indeed, it is almost a truism that the cost and complexity of the technology required to perform the intermittent functions will influence both the organization of those functions and the possibility of goal succession or displacement for the intermittent unit.

And finally, Etzioni notes the need in intermittent organizations for communication roles, not only for reinforcement of the dormant social structure, but also for the activation process. Nowhere in the RCC data can one distinguish a separate role fulfilling the former function. However, a communications role does exist in many RCCs for purposes of monitoring the environment for cues as to the need for activating the intermittent sub-system. Thus, an answering service operator may be assigned the responsibility of receiving rumor calls

after business hours, with the instruction that if three calls are received concerning the same topic, the supervisor of the RCC is to be notified so that he can commence the activation transition identified in column two of Table 3.

Summarizing the role of Etzioni's reinforcing structures in intermittent organizational units, it can be said that: (1) not all are to be found in all intermittent organizations, even taking into consideration the fact that one person may occupy more than one reinforcing role, (2) their existence depends to a large extent on the size, technology, and degree of formalization of the intermittent unit, and (3) those reinforcing structures which do exist may be much less elaborate than Etzioni implies.

Now Etzioni has also written that the active sub-unit in the dormant phase controls several processes which reinforce the expectations structure and culture of the intermittent unit. This is in contrast to Friedland and Nelkin, who maintained that intermittent organizations have no on-going culture, but instead one which has to be recreated (with each activation). These and other aspects of the structural and cultural integration of RCCs are considered below.

The first of Etzioni's "reinforcing processes" is communication from the active sub-unit to the dispersed participants. This was tapped in this study by means of a question asking the informants how often throughout the year the RCC is in formal contact (about RCC matters) with those persons who would be working for RCC during a crisis period. The results are not conclusive, but do seem to slightly favor Friedland

and Nelkin. Thus, about 60 percent of the thirty-two RCCs for which data on this were available formally contacted their staff about RCC matters less than one time per year. This indicates that communication from the active sub-unit to the dispersed participants is at least not very salient as a reinforcing process in our population.

A second reinforcing process cited by Etzioni is a short period of activation during the dormant period for instrumental and/or expressive purposes. This, too, is not usually found in rumor control centers, as only about one fourth of the RCC supervisors reported that they had ever conducted refresher training sessions or simulations for their volunteer staff. (In fact, some of these centers have since abandoned the practice.) Typical of the orientation of many supervisors was the following comment:

It is impossible to train people for something like this, in a practical sense. There's no specific science to it.

But since the culture and social cohesion of an intermittent unit can also be reinforced through informal interaction, the RCC informants were asked if the persons who would be working for the RCC during a crisis period have occasion during the dormant period to get together informally, apart from their RCC responsibilities. This is similar to, but more encompassing than, Etzioni's third reinforcing process, or what he calls "the regular flow of interaction in the social units in which the participants are dispersed during the dormancy period."¹¹ This type of interaction is a common occurrence in RCCs, as reported by two thirds of the supervisors. Indeed, this

seems to be a major source of social cohesion for RCCs as intermittent units. For not only do a few RCCs utilize such informal mechanisms as holding staff parties and sending Christmas greeting cards to their dispersed staff, but recruitment of staff tends to be in "clusters" drawn from existing social and friendship networks. For instance, the local clergymen's association frequently supplies several volunteers to the RCC, as does the local law school.

It was suggested in the preceding chapter that because the integration phase occurs "out of sequence" in crisis-oriented intermittent organizations, problems of system integration in the goal attainment phase might result, thereby leading to the use of structural mechanisms to counteract the integration problems. The data on RCCs show this to occur. Once again, the source of integration is in the recruitment base of the centers. Thus, most RCCs recruit such that they can utilize the mechanism of role carry-over and the "borrowing" of other interactional, structural, and procedural patterns. Role carry-over is illustrated in the case of an RCC which uses operators from the telephone company to serve as volunteer answerers during crisis times. The borrowing of other patterns is illustrated by another RCC which, although it draws its volunteers from many different departments of city government, ensures that for any given shift the staff consists only of persons who work together daily in one department during non-crisis times.

From the preceding account of the role of Etzioni's "reinforcing processes" and other integrating mechanisms, it can be concluded, then,

that the social integration of rumor control centers stems mainly from informal rather than formal mechanisms. Nor are the reinforcement processes in the dormant phase, which Etzioni cites, very salient for RCCs. Furthermore, to the extent that RCCs have a distinct operating culture, it appears that it is reinforced, as Friedland and Nelkin suggest, mainly by means of a brief period of socialization during the "adaptation-differentiation transition" phase identified in Table 3. This point is well illustrated by the words of one informant, below:

As each shift came on I passed around to them a sheet containing some "Do's" and "Don'ts" concerning how to handle people over the telephone, and coached them briefly on what was happening and about the kinds of calls we were receiving and advised them on how they could answer the calls.

Etzioni and Friedland and Nelkin do concur that a defining characteristic of intermittent organizations is that they undergo a structural metamorphosis between their dormant and activated periods. For rumor control centers this occurs when an increase in the demands made on the organization from the environment necessitates the calling in of volunteers or the transferring of staff from other parts of the parent organization to handle rumor control functions. Two aspects of the structural change are the increase in staff size and the increase in the number of levels in the hierarchy of the intermittent unit. Table 5 depicts the size of the RCC staffs per non-crisis shift and the maximum possible size of the staff if the RCC were to be activated for a major, large-scale incident. (Shifts found in this table are to be interpreted as hypothetical, since very few RCCs were actually

TABLE 5

STAFF SIZES OF RCCs IN CRISIS AND IN NON-CRISIS TIMES

Staff Size Per Non- Crisis Shift	Maximum Size of Core Staff Per Crisis Shift															Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11- 15	16- 20	21- 25	26+	NR	
Zero Persons	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	1	9
Equivalent of one person at less than 49% of full time	-	-	1	5	1	2	1	2	-	2	2	1	-	2	-	19
Equivalent of one person at 50-99% of full time	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	2
More than one per- son at full time	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	6
Total	-	1	1	7	2	3	4	2	-	3	5	2	3	2	1	36

pushed to the upper limits of their structural provisions for manpower.)

Accompanying Table 5 is Table 6 which shows the number of centers adding each number of persons to their staff, irrespective of what the staff size was in the non-crisis period. In this latter table a center shifting from zero to six staff members and a center shifting from one to seven staff members would both be classified as having added six persons. These tables show that most RCCs shift from having less than one full-time staff person in non-crisis times to a total of somewhere between four and ten people per shift in crisis

TABLE 6
NUMBER OF PERSONS ADDED TO RCCs IN CRISIS TIMES

Number of Persons Added	Number of RCCs	Cumulative Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
0	1	1	2.8	2.8
1-3	4	5	11.1	13.9
4-6	12	17	33.3	47.2
7-9	6	23	16.7	63.9
10-15	6	29	16.7	80.6
16-20	1	30	2.8	83.4
21-25	3	33	8.3	91.7
26+	2	35	5.6	97.3
N.R.	1	36	2.8	100.1
Total	36	36	100.1	100.1

times. In absolute terms, the most common magnitude of this structural shift is the addition of four to six people.

Table 7 shows that most RCCs have a relatively flat and simple structural configuration, even in crisis times. This is consistent with Palisi's generalizations about "transitory" organizations. Thus, only about one-sixth of the RCC population has more than two hierarchic levels (even where clerical personnel are considered to occupy a distinct level) in non-crisis times. In crisis times most centers have only two or three hierarchic levels. Regardless of the number of levels in non-crisis times, the number of levels added is not large, as Table 8 shows. There it can be seen that for four-fifths of the centers the expansion of the organizational chart involves adding only two or fewer levels. These figures reflect not only the

TABLE 7

NUMBER OF HIERARCHICAL LEVELS IN CRISIS AND IN NON-CRISIS TIMES

Number of Non-Crisis Levels	Number of Crisis Levels					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
0	-	6	3	2	1	12
1	1	4	3	1	-	9
2	-	3	3	1	1	8
3	-	-	4	1	-	5
4	-	-	-	1	1	2
Total	1	13	13	6	3	36

TABLE 8

NUMBER OF HIERARCHICAL LEVELS ADDED IN CRISIS TIMES

Number of Levels Added	Number of RCCs	Cumulative Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
0	10	10	27.8	27.8
1	9	19	25.0	52.8
2	10	29	27.8	80.6
3	5	34	13.9	94.5
4	1	35	2.8	97.3
5	1	36	2.8	100.1
Total	36	36	100.1	100.1

extent of the demands placed on the intermittent unit during the dormant and activated phases, but also the fact that an upper limit probably exists beyond which serious problems of coordination are

encountered if more levels are added. The data here suggest the hypothesis that for intermittent organizations of approximately the same size as RCCs, the optimal upper limit of hierarchical growth is two additional levels, irrespective of the number of levels in the dormant period.

So far, then, the data have shown that RCCs are very small in size during the dormant period and add about five people in responding to a major crisis. This is accompanied by a configurational expansion which seldom consists of adding more than two hierarchic levels, thereby keeping the organizational "shape" rather flat.

Another important structural feature of an intermittent organization, one which is highlighted in the model in Chapter III, is the degree to which the IO is differentiated from its parent organization. A composite quantitative index has been constructed which focuses upon the separateness of the intermittent organization from its parent organization, in terms of organizational structure and identity. The components of this index are presented in Figure 2 along with the value and raw frequency of each item. Table 9 presents this data in aggregate form. It is noteworthy that about one-fifth of the centers reveal no differentiation from the parent organization as measured by this particular index. In general, these quantitative data are consistent with qualitative impressions obtained in the interviews. For instance, the extreme low end of the continuum is well illustrated by the comment of one informant who said:

FIGURE 2

INDEX OF DIFFERENTIATION OF RCCs FROM PARENT ORGANIZATION

Frequency	Score Value	Description
		1. RCC has a separate budget from that of parent organization
23	0	a. No
13	1	b. Yes
		2. Existence of an organizational chart, charter, or written terms of reference for RCC
14	0	a. No
20	1	b. Yes
(N.R.=2)		
		3. How phones are answered in non-crisis times
19	0	a. Using name of parent organization only, or name of parent organization along with name of RCC, or anything other than name of RCC alone
16	1	b. Using name of RCC only
(N.R.=1)		
		4. How RCC is listed in the telephone directory
15	0	a. Not under "R" for Rumor Control or not as a separate department of city government
21	1	b. Under "R" for Rumor Control or as a separate department of city government
		5. Existence of a separate RCC staff or of separate staff assignments (excluding secretaries and supervisor) in non-crisis times
26	0	a. No
10	1	b. Yes

I feel that rumor control work cannot officially be separated from HRC [parent organization] work. . . . Most callers probably don't distinguish the RCC from the HRC, either.

One informant whose RCC had a differentiation score of 2 out of 5

perceived her RCC as a service of the parent organization, rather than

TABLE 9
 FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES
 OF DIFFERENTIATION OF RCCs FROM PARENT ORGANIZATION

Differentia- tion Score	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Undiffer- entiated	0	7	19.4	19.4
Moderate	1	12	13.9	33.3
	2	18	16.7	50.0
High	3	24	16.7	66.7
	4	30	16.7	83.4
	5	34	11.1	94.5
N.R.	2	36	5.6	100.1
Total	36	36	100.1	100.1

as a sub-structure of the parent organization (despite objective indicators of sub-structural distinctness). And an indication that a low level of "internal" differentiation from the parent organization may be projected externally is found in the comments of other informants occupying boundary positions in RCCs which scored low on differentiation. They pointed out that when they interact on behalf of the RCC with representatives from other organizations (particularly the police department) they are often treated in terms of their role in the parent organization.

In the following section the description of the structural features of intermittent organizations continues and lays the

groundwork for the testing of the hypotheses which were derived from the theoretical model of intermittent organizations in Chapter III.

Examination of the Theoretical Model

This section has as its major goal the examination of the theoretical model of intermittent organizations. This is pursued in terms of the statistical testing of several hypotheses derived from two key propositions in that model and in terms of a description of how rumor control centers progress through the phase movement cycle. The first of the two key propositions in the model contends that the impetus for movement of a sub-system out of a state of dormancy is provided by mounting tension in the system or turbulence in one or more sub-environments of the system. The second proposition contends that an organization-as-system acquires internal structural features which make it structurally isomorphic with its environment and permit it to respond effectively to turbulence in that environment. This response, of course, constitutes movement of the responding intermittent structure out of a state of dormancy into a period of activation.

In over-simplified terms the hypotheses which were derived from these propositions state that environmental turbulence (the independent variable) leads to certain structural features (the dependent variable) in the responding system. Those aspects of the system structure which are utilized here are its size, differentiation from its parent organization, formalization, and structural complexity. The operationalization of each of these is discussed immediately below.

Size is operationalized in terms of the maximum possible size of the staff if the RCC were to be activated for a major, large-scale incident. The operationalization of differentiation from parent organization was presented in Figure 2. Figure 3, based on Pugh et al.'s¹² scales of formalization, shows how the formalization of RCCs internal structure was tapped, in terms of formalization of organizational identity, role definitions, and the recording of role performance. It also shows how the population as a whole scored on each component item, while Table 10, like Table 9, presents the frequency distribution of the population on the aggregate index. These data show that in terms of these indicators, most RCCs can be considered to be moderately to highly formalized. How this degree of

TABLE 10
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FORMALIZATION SCORES OF RCCs

Formaliza- tion Score	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Low	0	2	5.6	5.6
	1	2	5.6	11.2
Moderate	2	6	16.7	27.9
	3	12	33.3	61.2
High	4	5	13.9	75.1
	5	5	13.9	89.0
N.R.	4	36	11.1	100.1
Total	36	36	100.1	100.1

FIGURE 3

INDEX OF FORMALIZATION OF RCCs

Frequency	Score Value	Description
I. Formalization of Organizational Identity		
		1. Existence of a written charter, or statement of purpose, or terms of reference for RCC
22	1	a. Yes
11	0	b. No
(N.R.=3)		
		2. Existence of a written table of organization
11	1	a. Yes
21	0	b. No
(N.R.=4)		
II. Formalization of Role Definition		
		3. Existence of any of the following: written job description, manual giving details of how to do any job on RCC staff, written policies, or written rules
25	1	a. Yes
8	0	b. No
(N.R.=3)		
III. Formalization in Recording of Role Performance		
		4. Records kept of amount of time put in by RCC workers
16	1	a. Yes
15	0	b. No
(N.R.=5)		
		5. Records kept of amount of work done (e.g., number of calls processed) by individual RCC workers
23	1	a. Yes
9	0	b. No
(N.R.=4)		

formalization relates to environmental turbulence is shown later in this section.

The final aspect of system structure whose operationalization is to be considered here is that of structural complexity. As shown in Figure 4, this was tapped in terms of the division of labor, size,¹³ hierarchical differentiation, and technology of the RCC. ("Technology" refers to the possession of certain types of communications equipment, to wit, two-way radios, police and fire department radio monitors, television sets, and tape recorder for incoming calls.) Table 11 shows the population distribution on this measure. It indicates a fairly normal distribution of scores, with no centers being found at the extremes. The relation of this variable to environmental turbulence will also be shown at a later point in this section.

TABLE 11
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY SCORES OF RCCs

Structural Complexity Score	Frequency	Cumulative Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Low	0	0	0.0	0.0
	1	0	0.0	0.0
	2	2	5.6	5.6
	3	4	11.1	16.7
	4	6	16.7	33.4
Moderate	5	7	19.4	52.8
	6	5	13.9	66.7
	7	5	13.9	80.6
	8	5	13.9	94.5
High	9	1	2.8	97.3
	10	1	2.8	100.1
	11	0	0.0	100.1
Total	36	36	100.1	100.1

FIGURE 4

INDEX OF STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY OF RCCs

Frequency	Score Value	Description
I. Division of Labor		
14	0	1. Night-time and weekend coverage for phones a. No
22	2	b. Yes
II. Size		
2. Maximum size of RCC core staff per shift in crisis		
0	0	a. One person
20	1	b. More than one but less than ten persons
9	2	c. More than ten but less than twenty persons
7	3	d. Twenty or more persons
3. Size of budget		
23	0	a. No separate budget for RCC
4	1	b. RCC budget includes cost of telephones and/or answering service only
9	2	c. RCC budget includes cost of telephones and/or answering service, plus other expenses
III. Hierarchical Differentiation		
4. Number of levels in the hierarchy during crisis		
1	0	a. One level
13	1	b. Two levels
13	2	c. Three levels
9	3	d. Four or more levels
IV. Technological Complexity		
5. Score on Index of Technological Complexity		
11	0	a. Zero or one
18	1	b. Two or three
7	2	c. Four or five

Environmental turbulence itself (independent variable) refers to one or more of the notions of input overload, uncertainty, indeterminacy, or change. As mentioned in Chapter II, the measure of turbulence in the race-relations environment utilized in this study was the number of race-related crowd incidents over a given period of time. This operationalization most directly refers to the "change" aspects of turbulence. That is, whereas in earlier times minority groups tended to acquiesce in their grievances, more recently these grievances have been addressed through crowd behavior. The number of race-related crowd incidents thus constitutes a measure of this change, or turbulence.

Table 12, then, summarizes the results of the statistical test of the hypotheses derived from the model relating this environmental turbulence to the above structural features of the intermittent organizational unit. All of the relationships turned out in the predicted (positive) direction, thereby providing a rudimentary form of support for the model.

But more importantly, Table 12 shows that all but one of the six relationships originally predicted by the model were supported by statistically significant correlation coefficients ranging in size from .41 to .58 and having less than a five percent probability that their magnitudes could have been obtained by chance alone. Indeed, among these latter relationships only the relationship with the volume of calls received leaves more than a one percent margin of influence for chance factors, while the relationship with formalization is so strong that there is only a 0.1 percent margin of influence for chance factors.

TABLE 12

RESULTS OF TESTS OF HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Correlation Coefficient	Degrees of Freedom*	Level of Significance	Strength of Relationship	Status of Hypothesis
I. a.	Amount of Turbulence	Degree of Differentiation	+ .28	31	n.s.	Very Weak	Not Supported
b.	Severity of Turbulence	Degree of Differentiation	+ .37	31	.05	Weak	Supported
II. a.	Amount of Turbulence	Degree of Structural Complexity	+ .45	33	.01	Moderate	Supported
b.	Severity of Turbulence	Degree of Structural Complexity	+ .40	33	.05	Moderate	Supported
III. a.	Amount of Turbulence	Size of Staff of RCC	+ .45	31	.01	Moderate	Supported
b.	Severity of Turbulence	Size of Staff of RCC	+ .20	31	n.s.	Very Weak	Not Supported
IV. a.	Amount of Turbulence	Degree of Formalization	+ .58	29	.001	Moderately Strong	Strongly Supported
b.	Severity of Turbulence	Degree of Formalization	+ .53	29	.01	Moderate	Supported

TABLE 12--Continued

Hypothesis	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Correlation Coefficient	Degrees of Freedom	Level of Significance	Strength of Relationship	Status of Hypothesis
V.	Amount of Turbulence	Volume of Input Demands	+ .41**	25	.05	Moderate	Supported
VI.	Volume of Input Demands	Degree of Structural Complexity	+ .52**	25	.01	Moderate	Supported

* The variability in the number of degrees of freedom is due to some non-responses to the mailed supplemental questionnaires. (The size of the population upon which each correlation coefficient is based is equal to the number of degrees of freedom, plus two. No N's reach 36 because one grossly deviant case was dropped from the analysis.)

** Unlike the other coefficients in this table, which are Pearsonian, these two are Spearman rank order correlation coefficients. Use of ordinal level measurement here was necessitated by RCCs' lack of precise measurement of the volume of input demands received. Also, since there were a large number of ties on the ranking of the centers by the number of serious race-related disorders, and since this would distort the value of the Spearman rho, no correlation coefficient was computed using this second measure of turbulence.

It is of vital importance to the model that the relationship between amount of turbulence and volume of input demands received was of at least moderate strength, and in turn that the relationship between volume of demands received and the internal structural characteristic "structural complexity" was also of at least moderate strength. Their importance stems from their location as linkage points in the model. Had the volume of demands not, in fact, been related to the amount of environmental turbulence, the model's underlying assumptions concerning systems responsiveness to turbulence would have been called into question.

However, despite such support for the model, the fact remains that the concept differentiation is also central to it. Yet, the hypothesis relating amount of environmental turbulence and systems differentiation was not supported by the data. So in an effort to specify the independent variable more precisely, the concept of severity (rather than just sheer amount) of environmental turbulence was introduced. (A "severe" race-related crowd incident was defined as one in which either one or more persons were killed after the precipitating event, or any two or more of the following conditions were met: two or more persons injured, ten or more persons arrested, looting reported, sniping reported.)

Such a specification does in fact prove instructive, in that severity of turbulence is statistically related, albeit weakly so, to the degree of differentiation of the RCC from its parent organization-as-system. In an attempt to determine the nature of its influence in

the conceptual system as a whole it was related (where practical and logically possible) to the other dependent variables. However, its influence was not uniform. Thus, although it slightly increased the strength of the relationship between turbulence and differentiation, for all the other dependent variables it decreased the strength of the relationships slightly, although leaving statistical significance intact. (The exception to this was the variable "maximum size of RCC staff," which showed a marked deterioration in the strength of its relationship to turbulence, even to the point of losing statistical significance.)

A further attempt to specify the nature of the relationship between environmental turbulence and differentiation of the RCC from its parent organization took the form of "controlling" for the relationship between differentiation and the size of the parent organization ($r = -.096$). Thus, when the effects of the size of the parent organization were partialled out, the relationship between turbulence and differentiation became considerably stronger. The Pearsonian correlation coefficient rose to $.46$ (d.f.=25) where it was statistically significant at the $.02$ level. However, the effect of the variable "size of parent organization" was much like that of "severity of turbulence" when it was related to the other structural variables. That is, the strengths of the relationship dropped, but statistical significance at the $.05$ level was retained except for the dependent variable "maximum size of RCC staff." Thus, with the effects of the size of the parent organization partialled out, the Pearsonian

correlation coefficient was .40 (d.f.=25) for the relationship between turbulence and structural complexity, .33 (d.f.=24) for the relationship between turbulence and maximum size of the RCC staff, and .46 (d.f.=23) for the relationship between environmental turbulence and the degree of formalization of the RCC.

It thus appears that the size of the intermittent unit's parent organization is a crucial intervening factor to be taken into consideration when assessing the relationship between turbulence in the environment of the intermittent unit and its differentiation from that parent organization.

Although these hypotheses were derived from the model in Chapter III and were generally rather well supported by the quantitative data, they do not illuminate all of the phases of the phase movement model of intermittent organizations. Therefore, this chapter concludes with a brief qualitative discussion of how the phase movement model as a whole applies to rumor control centers.

The adaptive phase, or what is called the "adaptation-differentiation transition" in Table 3, is said to involve (1) an accommodation of the system to inflexible reality demands, and (2) an active transformation (manipulation) of the external environment. For intermittent organizations this activation involves their differentiation out of the parent organization-as-system. Then the accommodation to, and manipulation of, the environment occurs in several forms, of which one is the mobilization of resources (e.g., in the labor subenvironment this involves the summoning of staff and volunteers). Another point of

interaction with the environment here involves the transmission of messages to the mass media in order to have the media publicize to the clientele subenvironment the channels of access (telephone numbers) for inputs by the clientele to the intermittent unit. Still other aspects of accommodation to the input demands of the environment include structural, normative, and technological elaboration (e.g., implementation of a stored organizational chart and normative set, mobilization of stored equipment), activation of linkage channels to sources of raw materials (e.g., since information is the raw material processed by an RCC, in this stage an RCC official may open lines of communication to information sources), and retrieval of stored information (e.g., removal from files of job descriptions for volunteers, etc.).

The goal attainment phase follows the adaptation-differentiation transition. It is here that the intermittent unit performs its major functional contribution for the larger social system. It is at this stage also, that the structural mechanisms of role carry-over and borrowed modes of procedure, interaction, and structure, are to be found operating to facilitate the coordination of activities. (Many RCC supervisors are actually quite conscious of the value of role carry-over and the borrowing of patterns from other groups.)

At some point into this phase an assessment is likely to occur concerning whether the intermittent unit can be de-activated or at least whether its staffing can be reduced. This assessment will occur at different points in this phase, depending in part upon the nature of the recruitment of staff. Thus, in some cities, volunteer staff

thoroughly enjoyed the goal "attainment" phase, wanted to prolong it, and on some occasions even contacted the RCC supervisor to suggest that the center be activated for certain minor incidents which occurred in the dormant phase. However, with other centers not only was considerable reluctance shown concerning activating the center at all, but furthermore, it was de-activated as soon as possible. This latter situation is more likely to prevail when the staff members are assigned to (rather than volunteer for) RCC duty from other departments and are not paid overtime for it.

Matthew Miles suggested that there are three types of criteria which may be used to determine the "termination" or de-activation point of a "temporary" system. One possible criterion was the identification of the de-activation point in explicit chronological terms; another was the linking of the de-activation point to the occurrence of a specific event; and the third was the making of the de-activation point contingent upon the achievement of a general state of affairs. For RCCs this latter method was the most common. That is, the termination of the goal attainment phase and initiation of the re-incorporation transition usually was made contingent upon the number of input demands to the RCC dropping to only a few per day.

The re-incorporation transition is the next phase in the phase movement process. This, succinctly put, is the "folding-up" of the activated RCC, and involves the dispersal of staff, the putting into storage of equipment and information, and the curtailment of relationships with certain sectors of the environment (particularly the clientele sector and the resource sector).

The RCC thus enters into the period of relative dormancy or latency in which the activities (if any) of the center are carried on, in most cases, by a clerical and/or professional employee of the parent organization, or in a few cases, by an active sub-unit of the RCC. While in other types of intermittent organization this might be the time in which Etzioni's reinforcing roles and reinforcing processes are carried out, in the population of RCCs this did not usually occur. Instead, most RCCs either became virtually totally dormant, or remained accessible to callers while not otherwise actively pursuing RCC goals. A few centers, largely those which engaged in "secondary" functions, did not fall into either of these patterns. Now, secondary functions are functions which may be only peripherally related to RCC goals, but which nevertheless serve both to sustain the RCC in non-crisis times and to build up relationships through which the RCC's salience and legitimacy can be promoted for purposes of later exploitation in crisis times. This phenomenon sometimes borders on goal succession and is illustrated in the extreme by an RCC which was so successful at it that it became totally independent of its parent organization, procured federal funding, and while retaining the words "Rumor Control Center" as part of its title, took on consumer education and public information goals.

Parsons et al.¹⁴ note that one way in which the existence of an intermittent organization is made manifest during the latent phase is that it imposes limitations on its members' commitments to other social systems. For RCCs this applies mainly to members of the active

core staff, such as when they occupy the status of being "on-call" after normal business hours. For most volunteers this restriction on other commitments rarely occurs. In fact, the difficulties in maintaining the motivational commitment of volunteers to the RCC were so great, and the efforts to counteract these difficulties were usually so minimal, that many centers experienced attrition in their list of available volunteers. In one city which had two RCC volunteers on duty each evening, the volunteers became so bored, due to only a relatively small number of calls being received, that participation rates declined. The responsibility for rumor control was therefore shifted to another parent organization, a twenty-four hour per day individual crisis telephone center. Its regular staff accepted rumor calls at any time, but developed a special contingency plan and structure by which they would staff and operate the center to cope with high volumes of rumor calls. Thus, the need to restrict the commitments of the intermittent organization's staff members to other social systems was diminished by abolishing the separateness of the active core staff.

This latent period is also characterized by a monitoring or mapping of the environment of the larger system for cues as to the need to move out of the dormant phase into the activation transition and goal attainment phases. As with the de-activation process, some RCCs have formal criteria for moving out of the dormant phase. Thus, a center might be activated only upon the proclamation of a state of emergency by the mayor, only upon the receipt of a specified number of

calls on the same topic over a given period of time (usually one evening), or, in the case of a center affiliated with the police department, only when the department as a whole entered, say, the third phase of its four phase civil emergency response procedure. Many RCCs, though, had only very vague criteria for moving out of the dormant state. This is illustrated by the supervisor of one center who said that his center would become activated "when a particular situation reaches crisis proportions."

In the revised sequence of phases set forth in Table 3 the integration phase is interposed between two latent periods. It was observed earlier in this chapter, however, that the population of rumor control centers exhibited very few integrating activities, and except for the rare staff party, integration could not be said to occupy a distinct phase. Thus, the nature and location of integrating activities in intermittent organizations remains somewhat confused and further research on the topic is necessary.

Since the nature of, and activities in, the remaining phases through which RCCs progress have already been depicted, this concludes the discussion of how the phase movement model applies to rumor control centers. But after such a lengthy and detailed chapter a brief summary of its major points is in order before the concluding remarks of the next chapter.

Summary

This chapter commenced with a case study of the Tridon Rumor Control Center which further illustrated the general nature of the RCC phenomenon and showed how the trends and indices discussed later in the chapter pertained to an actual RCC. Attention then shifted to those trends, as first the patterns of emergence and then the external relations of RCCs were taken up. The account of the emergence of RCCs revealed extensive networks of communication involved in establishing the centers, the lead taken by the mid-western cities in establishing them, and the important role of local system tensions in determining when a center first appeared in a city. The account of the external relations of RCCs revealed the variety of functions which they served (by original intent or not), including social control, mediation, facilitation of the tasks of other emergency organizations, and provision of psychological relief. The clientele, it was emphasized, is predominately White, due in part to widespread Black distrust of agencies affiliated with city government. Thus, RCCs were seen to be helping prevent the classic inter-racial pattern of rioting as much as the type of rioting which characterized the 1960's. Their exchanges with other organizations were seen to typically involve at least the police, mass media, and office of the mayor/city manager.

Since the thrust of the study is an organizational one, considerable attention was devoted to an analytic description of the internal organization of RCCs. The discussion was set in the framework of writings on intermittent organizations (or closely related phenomena)

by Etzioni, Friedland and Nelkin, and Palisi, with particular emphasis being given to Etzioni's "reinforcing structures and processes," which were found to be not very prevalent among RCCs. The very existence of reinforcing structures, it was suggested, is tied closely to the size, technology, and degree of formalization of the RCC. The structural mechanisms of role carry-over and the borrowing of interaction patterns from other settings were seen as functional substitutes for Etzioni's reinforcing processes. This pointed to the importance of recruitment in understanding the integration of intermittent organizations.

The disputed contention in the literature that the culture of intermittent organizations is reinforced mainly through a brief period of socialization prior to each activation, was supported by the present data, as was the view that IOs tend to have a rather flat "shape."

Selected aspects of the structural changes occurring with activation of the IO were also reviewed, and in substantive terms, it was observed that in responding to a major crisis, RCCs add about five more people but usually less than two more hierarchical levels. The hypothesis was advanced that for intermittent organizations of about the same size as RCCs in the "dormant" period, the optimal upper limit of hierarchical growth is two additional levels, irrespective of the number of levels in the dormant period.

Another structural characteristic, the degree of differentiation of RCCs from their parent organization, was also measured and

discussed. Then attention was devoted to the testing of six hypotheses derived from the theoretical model of intermittent organizations as systems in phase movement. These hypotheses related turbulence in the environment to phase movement and structural isomorphism in the intermittent system, in terms of that intermittent system's size, formalization, structural complexity, and differentiation from its parent organization-as-system. The hypotheses were generally well supported by the correlational data, although the size of the parent organization emerged as an important, but previously neglected, intervening variable in the relationship between turbulence and system structure. The chapter concluded with a description of how RCCs progress through the phase-movement cycle.

Notes: Chapter IV

1. For a case study of another RCC see Jack M. Middleton and Phil Runner, "Community Information Center: Case Study," Journal of Intergroup Relations 1 (1972): 3-37.
2. Since informants were guaranteed anonymity for themselves and their city the name "Tridon" is a fictitious one.
3. J. Rick Ponting, "Rumor Control Centers: Their Emergence and Operations," American Behavioral Scientist 16 (January-February 1973): 391-401.
4. "Rumor Control Center Tells What's Happening," Southern California Business (October 22, 1968): 48-49.
5. Lawrence Williams and Gerald Erchak, "Rumor Control Centers in Civil Disorders," Police Chief Magazine (May 1969): 26-32.
6. Conference on "The Value of Establishing Rumor Control Centers" Report (United States Department of Justice Community Relations Service, Washington, D.C., n.d.).
7. Indeed, the first three, and three of the next five to be established were in the mid-west.
8. Although the question was not posed to our informants, a re-hearing of the tape-recorded interviews reveals that nearly two-thirds of them mentioned whether the RCC had the initial approval or support of the mayor, city council, or city manager. Only two RCCs reported no such support.
9. When city size is dichotomized at 500,000 people and date of origin is dichotomized according to pre- versus post-January 1, 1969, Chi-squared equals 1.104.
10. Using the same dichotomy as before for date of origin and dichotomizing the ratio of non-whites to whites at 0.20, Chi-squared equals 2.08.
11. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 293.
12. D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson, C. R. Hinings, and C. Turner, "Dimensions of Organization Structure," Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (June 1968): 64-105.

13. Students of social organizations lack consensus as to the empirical and causal nature of the relationship between organizational size and structural complexity. The fact that in most cases there is a high correlation between the two permits the inclusion here of size as an indicator of structural complexity. See Marshall W. Meyer, "Size and the Structure of Organizations," American Sociological Review 37 (August 1972): 434-40.
14. Talcott Parsons, Robert Bales, and Edward Shils, Working Papers in the Theory of Action (New York: Free Press, 1953), p. 185.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Given the extensive summary of the previous chapter, only a brief synopsis of the major findings of the study will be presented here. This chapter will also address the practical issue of the effectiveness of rumor control centers in combatting rumors and will conclude with an evaluation of the strengths and limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.

Summary

The objectives of the study were to provide a descriptive account of rumor control centers and to improve upon the conceptualization of "intermittence" in the literature by using RCCs to develop and illustrate a model of crisis-oriented intermittent organizations and to test hypotheses derived from it. Although the study initially utilized the techniques of qualitative methodology, it gradually underwent an evolutionary focusing and re-direction of effort in accordance with emphases suggested by the data. This oscillatory cycle of theoretical focusing and referring back to the data continued to the point where reliance could eventually be placed on quantitative statistical techniques for verification purposes. The initial in-depth qualitative

approach, though, was instrumental in alerting the researcher to the importance of the role of boundary conditions of intermittent organizations. This led to the notions of environmental entropy and turbulence on the one hand, and adaptive cyclic systems response on the other hand. These, of course, became the keystones of the theoretical model which was supported so well by the quantitative data on RCCs.

That model conceptualized intermittent organizations as (sub)systems in phase movement. Its two key propositions were, first, that the impetus for movement of a subsystem out of a state of dormancy comes from mounting tension in the system or turbulence in the environment of the system, and second, that an organization-as-system acquires internal structural features which make it structurally isomorphic with its environment and permit it to respond effectively to turbulence in that environment. More succinctly put, environmental turbulence was said to lead to certain structural features in the responding system. These structural features were hypothesized to be greater size, formalization, structural complexity, and differentiation from the parent organization. The data supported the above two key propositions of the model, with environmental turbulence explaining up to a third of the variance in the structural features of the population of RCCs.¹ With that point established, the specific activities occurring in each of the phases of the phase movement model were then illustrated.

The study also reviewed the rather sparse literature on intermittent organizations, and after explaining the basic nature and

history of RCCs, proceeded to describe them in the light of that literature. This is summarized at the end of the preceding chapter and to discuss it further here would be redundant. Instead, the issue of the effectiveness of RCCs is taken up below.

A Note on the Effectiveness and Future of RCCs

The model used in this study posited that an organization-as-system acquires certain structural features which permit it to respond effectively to environmental turbulence. For purposes of this study it was assumed that greater organizational effectiveness would accrue from greater formalization, structural complexity, size, and differentiation of the rumor control center. However, in this section the thesis is argued that these structural features are insufficient to make RCCs very effective in pursuing their primary goal of preventing the spread of certain rumors. (No assessment of RCCs' effectiveness in pursuing their other goals is undertaken here.)

There are several reasons why most (though not all) rumor control centers are characterized by rather attenuated effectiveness in their pursuit of the goal of stopping the spread of rumors. Two of these reasons involve mechanisms of selectivity. At the social psychological level, selective perception by the callers is certain to occur and to distort the meaning intended by the RCC in its disseminated messages. This fact is recognized by a few RCC supervisors, as was shown in the case of the Tridon RCC in Chapter IV. At the social level, selectivity occurs vis-a-vis the clientele of RCCs. This occurs because the racial

or ethnic groups comprising the prospective clientele of RCCs may differ culturally in their patterns of telephone usage. For instance, data by Benjamin Singer and his associates imply that Blacks would not make extensive use of RCCs.² This is due to the RCCs' preponderant reliance on the telephone as a medium of communication and the Blacks' relative disuse of the telephone. In the Detroit riot of 1967, for example, only 9 percent of Singer's sample of Black arrestees found out about the riot by telephone. Forty-seven percent cited more informal sources, such as seeing for themselves or contacting friends, as the method by which they would check on whether or not an emergency was in progress.

The selectivity of clientele is accentuated in many cases by the affiliation of the RCC with a parent organization which is, or is part of, city government. Such an affiliation often jeopardizes the credibility of the RCC among a large proportion of the minority community, thereby reinforcing the tendency of those people to turn to other sources of information. Now an information-dispensing agency with impaired credibility simply cannot attain high levels of effectiveness. Yet on the other hand, those RCCs which are successful in building their credibility in the minority community often thereby lose a considerable degree of legitimacy with certain levels of the police department (their major source of information), which also impairs the RCCs' effectiveness.

But more importantly, the effectiveness of RCCs is mitigated by the basic assumptions which most RCC supervisors hold concerning the

rumor process. Now rumor is collective decision-making. Current sociological thinking views it as a process by which persons caught in an ambiguous situation refer back to their group for a meaningful, group-verified interpretation of that situation.³ Sociologists even seriously question the very assumption that rumors can and should be controlled.⁴ But most RCC supervisors showed no familiarity with this line of thought and their rumor control efforts therefore failed to reflect its implications. Instead, the model of rumor processes which they had in mind seemed to be the distortion-through-serial-transmission model, with its assumption of the social pathological nature of rumor. Thus, most supervisors emphasized the dysfunctional aspects of rumors while holding a very limited appreciation of such positive functional contributions of the rumor process as its fulfillment of an unsatisfied demand for news, and the group support it offers.⁵

Finally, the effectiveness of RCCs is limited by the very fact that most of them are intended to stop rumors which have already started circulating rather than attacking those rumors' root causes in the racial (and economic) institutions of the society. As one informant put it, "Rumor control is not going to do any good in the face of massive forces impinging in the opposite direction."⁶

Given these impediments to organizational effectiveness, and the changing nature of the race relations environment in America, what will become of RCCs in the future? Five trends and possibilities are detectable here and are outlined below.

One already observable trend which can be projected into the future involves the displacement or succession of goals, and the corresponding structural realignments. Here existing RCCs take on new (related) functions and new structures while relegating the rumor control functions and structure to a much more dormant status within the organization. This response has the effect of increasing the legitimacy of the center while providing for the availability of the rumor "control" mechanism in crisis times. It is illustrated by those RCCs which are becoming either general information and referral centers or ombudsman's offices. However, this option is not open to many RCCs because in their respective cities such ombudsman or information and referral offices had already been established under the auspices of other organizations before the decrease occurred in the levels of turbulence in the race relations environment.

The second observable trend is the co-optation of RCC functions by other non-intermittent organizations having either a crisis or non-crisis orientation. An example of the former was cited in the previous chapter where RCC responsibilities were shifted to an individual crisis center. An example of co-optation by a non-crisis-oriented, non-intermittent organization is the assumption of RCC responsibilities by an existing city information agency. With co-optation, as with goal displacement, the rumor control function receives little emphasis. But with co-optation the rumor control structure may be disbanded or become so dormant that reactivation is almost like the creation of a new social unit.

A third observable trend, involving the emergence of RCCs in other institutional spheres, may be called institutional decentralization. It began around 1970, as the locus of racial and minority group turbulence shifted from the "streets" to other locales. It is illustrated by the emergence of RCCs (often after consultation with the municipal-level RCCs) on university campuses, in Boards of Education, and even in individual schools. In contrast to the two previous patterns, this pattern involves the increased salience of the RCC. It can be analyzed from precisely the same theoretical vantage point as was utilized in the present study.

A fourth possible adaptation for RCCs would be to implement internal structural changes which would make them more congruent with the social structure of the rumor process. For greater effectiveness in controlling rumors such changes would, at a minimum, have to consist of greater decentralization through a more visible presence of the RCC staff in the field during crisis times. (Such a presence in non-crisis times, however, might evoke overtones of "thought control.") If RCC staff members were recruited from among the leadership of local neighborhoods they would be integrated into neighborhood communication networks which are the locus of the rumor process. It is on such a local level that manipulation of the rumor process (which is, in fact, the goal of RCCs) is likely to be most successful. However, very few RCCs utilized such an approach and due to both the unfamiliarity of RCC supervisors with the sociology of rumor and the political implications of such an approach, it is unlikely to gain ascendancy. Nor is it recommended here.

The final pattern to be discussed here is simply the "death" of rumor control centers. This occurred to RCCs in many small cities (less than 100,000 population) and to three in the present study after data had been collected from them. However, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether an RCC is in effect "dead" or not. This is because some are never officially disbanded but show no signs of life, while others which are officially disbanded are sometimes reported to be able to be re-activated quickly if necessary. Nevertheless, organizational death, in one form or another, does seem to be the likely status of most RCCs within the very near future.

Before moving on to a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the study, this chapter digresses briefly to explain why RCCs are projected to die out rather than persist.

The lack of organizational persistence of RCCs cannot simply be explained by the subsiding of the environmental turbulence to which they were initially a response. Such an explanation is inadequate due to the fact that many other types of organizations persist in the face of a decreasing need for their initial product. Rather, the explanation for the actual or projected disappearance of RCCs is to be found in characteristics of crisis-oriented intermittent organizations in general, as well as in some peculiar aspects of RCCs.

Intermittent organizations, especially crisis-oriented ones which experience relatively short and infrequent periods of activation (like RCCs), have difficulty in maintaining the motivational commitment of their members. Without some form of reward and reinforcement

in the dormant period staff members (particularly volunteers) simply become bored with the IO and their commitment to, and identification with, the IO attenuates. Furthermore, it has already been pointed out in Chapter IV that RCCs for the most part lacked such reinforcing processes as were identified by Etzioni.

Not only did RCC members generally lack reinforcement for their role in the RCC, they also lacked a vested interest in the RCC. Thus, because it was only a part-time activity with a low or non-existent budget, the RCC seldom provided rewards of status or security to its staff members. Indeed, when the RCC was staffed by members of the parent organization, those persons often considered RCC responsibilities to be a nuisance and inconvenience which detained them from more important responsibilities in the parent organization. Thus, they certainly lacked a vested interest in its perpetuation.

Rumor control centers often tended to lack legitimacy and saliency not only among their prospective clientele, but also among other crisis-oriented organizations. Many centers failed to counteract this in that they failed to seek out other ("secondary") functions the performance of which could have provided such saliency and legitimacy. Lacking these two qualities they thereby lacked important allies who could have defended them when city budget-makers found other more politically relevant uses for scarce financial resources. Unfortunately for RCCs, their lack of a tangible product made them particularly susceptible to such financial cutbacks.

And finally, all but a few RCCs lacked a crucial element for systems survival. That element was a mechanism to provide adequate feedback concerning the extent to which the organization-as-system was achieving its goals. Without such feedback RCCs were unable to legitimate themselves, and the consequences of that were described above. (Had RCCs in fact utilized feedback mechanisms they would probably have indicated rather minimal success in the pursuit of the goal of preventing the spread of rumors.)

Thus, several factors, some of which were mutually reinforcing, were, or are, operating against the persistence of RCCs. The combined weight of these factors is sufficient to bring about the death of most RCCs.

Evaluation of the Study

One of the primary purposes of a theoretical model is to provide a meaningful explanation of a phenomenon. The adequacy of the present model in this regard can only be assessed in relation to the understanding provided by other models of intermittent organizations. However, due to sociologists' neglect of IOs, alternative models are scarce, to say the least. Nevertheless, other theoretical models -- including models of voluntary action, goal succession, and Etzioni's model of successive division of compliance -- were brought to bear on the data. But they were all discarded due to their circumscribed powers of explanation. The one model which did bring order and meaning to the breadth and diversity of the phenomenon under study was that

of systems in phase movement. That model was, of course, ultimately adopted in this study. It is seen by the author as an improvement upon prior explanations of intermittence but awaits the development of future models before its relative contribution to an understanding of intermittence can be more fully assessed.

Theoretical models can also be assessed on the basis of their predictive success. The model utilized in this study has predicted the death of RCCs, but on this dimension too we must wait a few years (probably only two or three) before fully evaluating its adequacy.

A definite asset of the model is its generalizability to crisis-oriented IOs other than RCCs. This generality derives from the grounding of the model in general systems theory and the wide scope of the constructs of that theory. For instance, the fact that turbulence can exist at the social psychological level of social systems suggests the analysis of suicide prevention centers as an adaptive response to turbulence in the social psychological environment.

The value of this model also lies in its contribution to the literature on social organizations. Not only does it shed light on a form of social organization which is relatively neglected in the sociological literature, but it also furthers our understanding of organizational change and survival, in terms of the importance of such factors as negative feedback, secondary legitimacy-building functions, structural congruence with the environment, and attention to integration matters when the organization is not involved in goal

attainment activities. Furthermore, the study is valuable because it has fortuitously collected and presented a body of organizational data which will be unavailable to later researchers due to the basic changes being experienced by RCCs, as described above.

But despite these strengths, the present study also has its limitations. One of these is its simplicity, although simplicity might also be considered an asset. The problem here, though, is that the model contains only one independent variable (environmental turbulence) and that variable explained no more than 34 percent of the variance in any of the dependent variables. An independent variable which explains so much of the variance in the dependent variable is indeed a powerful explanatory tool, but it should not stand alone. Instead, the model should be expanded to include other independent and contextual variables such as the size of the parent organization of the intermittent unit.

Another limitation of the study is that some of the data were originally collected for another purpose, and being cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, they did not permit the kind of testing of the hypotheses which the author would have preferred. Thus, a correlational, rather than a strictly causal analysis was performed. However, in conjunction with the above-mentioned need to expand the model, the correlational approach could, in future research, be utilized to advantage by developing it into a path analysis model.

Two other limitations of the data should be mentioned. The first is that due to their very low levels of formalization, a few of

the RCCs in the study were not good examples of intermittent organizations, although they did at least add breadth to the data. And finally, the model utilized here could probably have been improved had the data included other perspectives than those of the supervisors and staff of the intermittent organization. It would be preferable, in future studies, to obtain the perspective of other members of the parent organization and members of other organizations with which intermittent organizations interact. In the following section the study will conclude with additional suggestions concerning what is needed in future research on intermittent organizations.

Suggestions for Future Research

The field of intermittent organizations is so underdeveloped sociologically that a myriad of suggestions for future research could be presented. This section, however, confines itself to a few which the author believes will have the greatest "payoff" for researchers.

Methodologically, a longitudinal study design holds great promise for penetrating to a deeper understanding of intermittent organizations. For instance, for purposes of further testing the hypotheses in the foregoing model, measures of variables should be available for both the dormant period and the activated period, so that the degree of change in the structural variables over time can be related to the degree of change over time in the level of turbulence. Also from a methodological viewpoint, it would be useful to test the current model under laboratory conditions so as to permit the experimental control of exogenous variables.

From a substantive viewpoint, it would be useful to compare different types of intermittent organization which characteristically experience different levels of turbulence. For instance, the present model would be further supported if research showed that other types of IOs in more turbulent environments than RCCs tend, on the average, to be larger, more structurally complex, more formalized, and more differentiated from their parent organizations than RCCs. Of course, this is related to the crucial need for research to determine to what extent the model used in this study, with its emphasis on turbulence, is applicable to intermittent organizations which are not oriented to crises.

The present study has also uncovered several very specific issues which require further research. For instance, the statistically significant role of the size of the IO's parent organization suggests that other properties and factors in the parent organization might affect the intermittent unit (in its structure, ease of activation, etc.). Further research is also called for by the finding that there seems to be an upper limit to the number of hierarchical levels which can be added before creating problems of coordination. This and other problems of rapid organizational growth experienced by other IOs (such as census bureaus) could make a substantial contribution not only to the understanding of IOs, but to the broader literature on organizational differentiation and growth. Research is also needed into the question of why some IOs adapt differently than others to a decrease (over an extended period of time) in society's need for them.

For instance, what makes for organizational persistence versus succession of goals versus organizational death? And are the factors operating here any different than those causing the same results in non-intermittent organizations? Other issues to which this study has called attention and on which further research is needed are the roles of technology, size, formalization, and recruitment in intermittent organizations.

Two final suggestions for future research will be offered. One concerns the application of the phase movement model to other than intermittent organizations. Thus, the response of certain other organizations, and even entire communities, to natural disasters can be viewed analytically as an adaptive reaction to entropy crisis in the bio-physical-social environment. The concept of phase movements had considerable potential here in linking theoretically the dimensions of structure, function, and time in the disaster response process, and the idea of a "latent disaster subculture" meshes well with the framework outlined here. Research into this could not only generate new data on phase movements in crisis-oriented IOs (such as Red Cross and Civil Defense organizations), but would also open new horizons in the field of disaster research.

And finally, to further the development of knowledge about intermittent organizations it is suggested that an exploratory study be conducted using the so-called "constant comparative method"⁷ of generating theory. Using a sample drawn from each of the different types of intermittent organization (as presented in Chapter I, Table 1

of the current study) such a study could furnish valuable new insights which would lead to the modification of the present theory or perhaps to the supplanting of the present theory by others having even greater explanatory power.

Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the present study, its author will consider it a success if it contributes in even the smallest way to the initiation of these or other research endeavors into the topic of intermittent organizations. For it is through such research that the study of intermittent organizations can best be propelled out of the state of dormancy it has occupied for virtually a decade as a neglected organizational type.

Notes: Chapter V

1. For a Pearsonian correlation coefficient, which was used in this study, the amount of variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the independent variable is equal to the square of the correlation coefficient, times 100 percent. Thus, environmental turbulence accounts for 33.64% ($.58^2 \times 100\%$) of the variability in the degree of formalization across the population of RCCs, and 20.25% ($.45^2 \times 100\%$) of the variability in structural complexity.
2. Benjamin D. Singer, The Detroit Riot of July 1967 (Detroit: Behavior Research Institute, 1967), p. 46; and Benjamin D. Singer, Richard Osborn, and James Geschwender, Black Rioters: A Study of Social Factors and Communication in the Detroit Riot (Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath Lexington, 1970), p. 44.
3. For an elaboration of this conceptualization see Ralph Turner, "Collective Behavior," in Handbook of Modern Sociology, ed. Robert Faris (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 382-425; and Tamotsu Shibutani, Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1966).
4. See Shibutani, Improvised News, p. 200; and Orrin Klapp, Currents of Unrest: An Introduction to Collective Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1972), p. 253.
5. Shibutani, Improvised News, p. 17.
6. Although this section has argued that RCCs are not generally very effective in preventing the spread of rumors, this should not be interpreted to mean that they should necessarily be eliminated. They do fulfill other functions, as mentioned in Chapter IV, and on some occasions under certain circumstances, they can contribute to the suppression of potentially dangerous rumors. See Shibutani, Improvised News, pp. 200-208 for a discussion of these conditions.
7. Barney Glazer and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), chap. 5, pp. 101-116.

APPENDIX A

RUMOR CONTROL CENTERS STUDY
REVISED (3/72) QUESTIONNAIRE

DISASTER RESEARCH CENTER
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
127-129 W. 10TH AVE.
COLUMBUS, OHIO
43201

INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVIEWER:

1. If you are short of time, the most important sections are "Internal Structure" and "Relationships with Other Organizations." Other important questions are marked by an asterisk (*). Very important questions are marked with two asterisks (**).
2. If the RCC keeps records, ask permission to borrow or xerox them (within a reasonable volume) and DRC will pay xeroxing costs.
3. If permission to borrow or xerox records is not granted, primary emphasis should be placed on determining WHO the callers are (i.e., race, sex, address, age, telephone number, plus any other identifying information). Next in priority is the type of question each type of caller asks.
4. Where sampling is necessary, be sure to specify in detail the sampling procedure used.
5. Where phone numbers of callers are available in RCC records (or in some RCC records) obtain also:
 - (i) a street map of the city and suburbs for purposes of plotting the origins of calls to RCC.
 - (ii) (from the telephone company) a copy of the special directory which gives telephone numbers in sequential order accompanied by the address at which each phone is located.

This study is an extension of our study of Community Relations Commissions in sixteen cities across the United States. The Rumor Control Center Study involves Rumor Control Centers in Canada and Northern Ireland, as well.

This study is divided into six general areas, some of which are shorter than others. These six areas are:

1. General Background and Formation
2. Internal Structure
3. Relationships with Other Organizations
4. Operations During Non-Crisis, Non-Tension Times
5. Operations During Times of Crisis, Strain, or Tension
6. Conclusion

Let's start by going into the background of the RCC here and the conditions which led to its establishment.

PART I. GENERAL BACKGROUND & FORMATION

1. INTERVIEWER: ENTER NAME OF CITY _____

2. What is the correct title or name of the "rumor control center" (RCC)? _____

* 3. When was the RCC first established? _____
(At least month and year)

* 4. a. What specific circumstances in your community here led to the establishment of the RCC?

b. IF NOT MENTIONED ALREADY, What influence did the President's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders ("Kerner Commission") have on the establishment of the RCC?

5. a. How was the RCC created?
(i) by city ordinance (ii) by city resolution
(iii) by executive order of the mayor (iv) other (please specify)

b. Was there any opposition to its creation?
(i) No (ii) Yes

* c: IF "YES," Could you describe this opposition for me? (PROBE FOR SOURCE AND NATURE OF OPPOSITION)

6. What sources of information did your RCC have in learning how to set up and operate an RCC?

Source	When in Contact	What Learned

- * 7. a. Have representatives from any other RCC ever sought information concerning how your RCC works?
(i) No (ii) Yes
- b. IF "YES," From which cities were these?
- c. Do you know which of these cities eventually did establish an RCC?
- * 8. a. What is the RCC's official function, as described in its "charter"?
- b. What do you personally feel is the RCC's function?
- c. (IF APPLICABLE) How do the functions of the RCC during times of crisis or tension differ from its functions during non-crisis, non-tension ("normal") times?
9. What do you feel is RCC's greatest contribution to the community?
10. a. Are there any other RCC-type organizations or groups in your community or nearby area?
(i) No (ii) Yes
- b. IF "YES," Could you describe your relationship with them?
- c. Could you please give me the full name and address of these organizations?

<u>Name of Organization</u>	<u>Address</u>
-----------------------------	----------------

- **11. a. Has your community ever been faced with a period of heightened tension, strain, or crisis during which the RCC received more than the normal number of calls?
(i) No (ii) Yes
- b. How many such occasions have occurred? _____
- c. What and when were these occasions? (INTERVIEWER: PROBE FOR THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF EVENT AND FILL IN THE TABLE)
- (i) civil disturbance
- (ii) natural disaster
- (iii) man-made disaster (e.g., accident, explosion)
- (iv) visit of some prominent or controversial person; whom?
- (v) anniversary of some event having special significance for some ethnic group; name of event? _____
- (vi) public school disturbances
- (vii) bomb scare
- (viii) other (please specify) _____

Date(s)	Approximate # of Calls Received	Duration	Occasion(s)

- d. Do you feel that the RCC should be activated in response to a natural disaster?
 (i) No (ii) Yes

PART II. INTERNAL STRUCTURE

1. a. Is the RCC a part of another organization?
 (i) No (ii) Yes
- b. IF "YES," What is that organization and please explain RCC's relationship to it.
2. To whom is the head of the RCC responsible? (i.e., the position of the person)
3. a. Who answers RCC's telephones during office hours of non-crisis, non-tension times?
 (i) secretaries of parent organization
 (ii) RCC staff member who also has duties in parent organization
 (iii) person whose sole duties are in RCC (as far as any parent organization is concerned)
 (iv) tape recorded message
 (v) RCC phones are not answered in non-crisis times
 (vi) other (please specify) _____
- b. How are the RCC phones answered during non-crisis, non-tension times?
 (i) using name of RCC only
 (ii) using name of parent organization only
 (iii) using name of parent organization and RCC
 (iv) RCC number is made known only during times of heightened tension
 (v) other (please specify) _____
- c. How is the RCC listed in the telephone book? (More than one might apply)
 (i) RCC not listed in phone book
 (ii) under "R"
 (iii) under "C" for "crisis"
 (iv) under "I" for "information"
 (v) under "City Government"
 (vi) under parent organization's listing
 (vii) under emergency numbers in front of telephone book
 (viii) RCC number publicized on buses, newspapers, cards, etc.
 (circle which)
 (ix) other (please specify) _____

d. How are the phones answered during times of crisis or heightened community tension?

(i) same as in Question 3b above

(ii) other (please specify) _____

4. We have found that different RCC's exist in different degrees of dormancy or activation, and we would like to find out to what extent and in what ways your RCC exists during non-crisis, non-tension times. For instance:

a. How many people are involved in RCC activities during non-crisis, non-tension times? _____ (IF "NO ONE," OMIT QUESTIONS 4b, c, d, and f. PROCEED TO QUESTION 4g)

b. What is the title of the position (rank) of each of these persons?

c. Are each of these persons involved full-time or part-time in RCC activities?

d. What are the hours of operation during normal times? _____

f. If the RCC telephones are not manned by RCC staff overnight, do overnight calls to RCC get answered by some other organization?

(i) No (ii) Yes

IF "YES," Is that organization:

(i) the police department (ii) the fire department

(iii) a professional answering service (iv) some other organizations (please specify) _____

QUESTIONS g, h, and j ARE FOR RCC's WHICH EXIST IN A STATE OF ZERO-OR VERY LOW-ACTIVATION DURING NON-CRISIS TIMES:

g. Under what circumstances might the RCC become activated?

h. Who decides? (i.e., position of the person)

j. What procedures are followed in activating the RCC?

5. a. What is the maximum size of the RCC staff (including volunteers) during times of crisis or heightened community tension? _____

b. What is the usual, probable, or likely size of the RCC staff (including volunteers) during times of crisis or heightened community tension? _____

6. What are the hours of operation of the RCC during times of crisis of heightened community tension?

(i) twenty-four hours per day

(ii) other (please specify) _____

7. a. What are the geographical boundaries of your official "jurisdiction"?
- (i) local neighborhood(s) only (please specify which one(s)) _____
- (ii) entire city _____
- (iii) city and surrounding county _____
- (iv) other (please specify) _____

- b. Does RCC ever get calls from outside these boundaries?
- (i) No (ii) Yes

8. a. Does the RCC have more than one physical location in the community?
- (i) No (ii) Yes

- b. IF "YES," How many? _____

- ***9. a. Would you please describe the table of organization of the RCC, including who reports to whom?
- (i) during non-tension ("normal") times (IF APPLICABLE)
- (ii) during times of "crisis" or heightened tension

(INTERVIEWER: ENTER ORGANIZATION CHART FOR EACH RESPECTIVE TIME PERIOD)

- b. What are the responsibilities of each of these persons?
(INTERVIEWER FILL IN CHART)

Title of Position	# of People in this Position	Work Status (V=Volunteer, PT=Part Time, FT=Full Time)

10. a. Is the organizational structure of the RCC "modeled" after some other RCC?
- (i) No (ii) Yes, entirely (iii) Yes, in part

- b. IF "YES," What organization is it modeled after and in what way?

11. a. Are all positions within RCC under Civil Service?
- (i) No (ii) Yes

- b. IF "NO," Which ones are not? _____

12. a. From where are volunteers recruited?

- b. How often throughout the year is the RCC in formal contact with those persons who would be working for RCC during a time of crisis?

- c. Do these persons have occasion to get together informally apart from their RCC responsibilities?
 (i) No (ii) Yes
- d. Does the RCC hold refresher training sessions or simulations for volunteer staff?
 (i) No (ii) Yes
- *13. We are interested in the types of equipment which RCC might have the use of during "crisis" times. Here is a check list of equipment. Across the top of the page are the questions I want to ask you about each piece. (INTERVIEWER: DO NOT ALLOW RESPONDENT TO SPEND TOO MUCH TIME ON THIS QUESTION)

Item	During Crisis Times		# of pieces of this equipment
	Is this equipment available for RCC use?		
	No	Yes	
A. Telephone lines from the public?			
B. Unlisted telephone lines or direct telephone lines to other organizations?			
C. Sequential telephone number? (If first RCC number is busy, automatically rings on second RCC number, etc.)			
D. City telephone directory cross-indexed by neighborhood?			
E. Notebook for answerers?			
F. Portable walkie-talkies?			
G. Two-way radios in automobiles?			
H. Organizationally owned or subsidized automobiles?			
I. Two-way radio connections with other organizations			
J. Police Department radio monitor?			
K. Fire Department radio monitor?			
L. Radio monitor for any other city or county departments?			
M. Radio monitor for any other law enforcement agency?			
N. Commercial television set?			
O. Closed circuit television set? (From what organization? _____)			
P. Commercial radio receiver?			
Q. Area maps?			
R. Bulletin boards or blackboards in RCC control room?			
S. Tape recorded telephone announcements?			
T. Tape recorder for incoming calls?			
U. Plastic map overlays?			
V. Bull horn?			

- d. What kind of an image does the police department have of RCC?
- e. Has this image changed at all? In what ways?
- f. Does RCC ever have any difficulty in getting the police department's cooperation?
- g. Does the police department take RCC into its confidence concerning incidents in the community?
- h. Do you ever get the impression that the police department is not totally leveling ("telling it like it is") with RCC?
 (i) No (ii) Yes, occasionally (iii) Yes, often
- j. Has RCC had any problems gaining acceptance from the police department?
 (i) No (ii) Yes

IF "YES," What kinds of problems?

- k. Has RCC had any other problems or difficulties of any kind with the police department?
 (i) No (ii) Yes

IF "YES;" Would you elaborate on that?

- l. Does RCC ever act as a "go-between" (i.e., a mediating mechanism) between the citizens and the police department? (e.g., for information, complaints, etc.)
 (i) No (ii) Yes

IF "YES," Can you give me an example of this?

- *3. We are also interested in your relationship with the mayor or city manager's office and I'd like to ask you some of the same questions as they apply to this relationship. For instance:

- a. On the average month, how many times would RCC have contact with the mayor/city manager's office? _____
- b. Do you send liaison personnel to the mayor/city manager's office during times of crisis or heightened community tension, or do they send liaison to RCC?
- c. What kind of image does the mayor/city manager and his top aides have of RCC?
- d. Does RCC ever have any difficulty in getting the cooperation of the mayor/city manager?
 (i) Usually (ii) Occasionally (iii) Seldom (iv) No

- e. Does the mayor/city manager's office take RCC into its confidence concerning incidents in the community?
- f. Do you ever get the impression that the mayor/city manager's office is not totally leveling ("telling it like it is") with RCC?
 (i) No (ii) Yes, occasionally (iii) Yes, often
- g. Has RCC had any other problems or difficulties of any kind with the mayor/city manager's office?
 (i) No (ii) Yes

IF "YES," Would you elaborate on that?

4. With what other organizations, agencies, or groups does RCC have important interactions:
- a. During "normal" times?
- b. During times of crisis or heightened community tension?
5. a. Are there any governmental agencies (at any level) which have exhibited negative or unfavorable attitudes toward the RCC?
 (i) No (ii) Yes
- b. IF "YES," Which ones are these, and how did it come about?
6. In general, what has been the nature of the attitudes of the local "civil rights" organizations toward the RCC? (INTERVIEWER: LET INFORMANT USE HIS OWN DEFINITION OF "CIVIL RIGHTS" ORGANIZATIONS)
7. a. How have the mass media depicted RCC to their public?
- b. Do the mass media ever give you free advertising?
 (i) No (ii) Yes
- c. Has the mass media ever done a feature news story on RCC?
 (i) No (ii) Yes How many times? _____
8. a. Of all the local organizations which we have talked about so far, which ones have been the easiest to work with?
- b. Why have they been easy to work with?
- *9. a. On the other hand, which of the local organizations have been the most difficult to work with?

(INTERVIEWER: ASK b ONLY IF OTHER THAN POLICE OR MAYOR/CITY MANAGER)

b. Why have they been difficult and what kinds of problems have you experienced with them?

- **10. a. Have any attempts ever been made to exert informal political pressures on RCC?
 (i) No (ii) Yes
- b. IF "YES," Please describe the situation.
- **11. a. Has the RCC itself ever become a political issue?
 (i) No (ii) Yes
- b. IF "YES," Could you elaborate on that?
- ***12. a. Does the RCC in any way act as a "go-between" between the Blacks and the Whites or between any two or more minority communities? (e.g., one community feeling threatened by another community on the basis of the rumors, so calls RCC to find out if a particular course of action is really planned by the other community)
 (i) No (ii) Yes
- b. IF "YES," In what way is this so? Could you give me an example?

PART IV. OPERATIONS DURING NON-CRISIS, NON-TENSION TIMES

1. What is the position of the RCC about receiving citizen complaints regarding city (or county, if applicable) government?
- **2. During a typical or average non-crisis month, approximately how many calls are received by the Rumor Control Center (per. se)?
- *3. What are the major types of questions asked of the RCC during non-crisis, non-tension times?

*PART V. OPERATIONS DURING TIMES OF CRISIS, STRAIN OR TENSION

- *1. INTERVIEWER: REFER BACK TO PART I, Q. 11 FOR INCIDENTS TO WHICH RCC HAS RESPONDED. SELECT AN INCIDENT INVOLVING COMMUNITY CONFLICT (POTENTIAL OR MANIFESTED) AND A (COMPARATIVELY) LARGE NUMBER OF CALLS RECEIVED BY RCC. IF CHOICE IS BETWEEN A DIFFUSE (e.g., riot) INCIDENT VERSUS A SPECIFIC (e.g., disturbance in a particular school) INCIDENT, CHOOSE THE MORE DIFFUSE ONE.

I would like to focus our attention on RCC's involvement in the _____ incident which you mentioned earlier. Would you describe what happened in that incident in a little more detail?

- ***2. What was the nature of the relationship between the RCC and the police during this crisis period and how did it differ from the relationship in "normal" times? (PROBE FOR (i) cooperation-antagonism and (ii) type, direction, and amount of information exchange)

- **3. a. Were you in contact at all with the mayor/city manager's office?
 (i) No (ii) Yes

IF "NO," PROCEED TO QUESTION 4.

- b. IF "YES," Did they call you the first time or did you call them?
 (i) mayor/city manager initiated contact
 (ii) RCC initiated contact

c. How often were you in contact with them?*

d. What did you discuss with them (i.e., what information was exchanged)?

4. What was the relationship between the RCC and the mass media during the crisis? (INTERVIEWER: PROBE FOR THE FOLLOWING, OF WHICH MORE THAN ONE MIGHT APPLY)

- (i) they publicized RCC's phone number
 (ii) they sought information from RCC
 (iii) RCC sought information from the mass media
 (iv) RCC initiated contact with them to obtain their assistance in stopping a rumor
 (v) RCC had no contact with the mass media
 (vi) other (please describe)

5. What are RCC's major sources of information regarding the occurrence of tension or "incidents" in the community?

- *6. a. Does the RCC have any policy concerning disseminating information which is true, but which might be considered inflammatory?
 (i) No (ii) Yes

b. IF "YES," would you describe that policy please? (INTERVIEWER: IF NECESSARY, POSE A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE FOR THE RESPONDENT, e.g., severe police brutality incident)

- ***7. a. We are interested in the image of RCC within the various racial, ethnic, etc., groups and sub-groups within the community. Could you tell us about that? (INTERVIEWER: NOTE CHART TO BE FILLED IN BY YOU ON NEXT PAGE)

- **b. Do you have any way of knowing or estimating what percentage of your calls come from each of these groups?
 (i) No (ii) Yes

IF "YES," Can you give us some figures?

Group	% of calls which came from this group	General Image of RCC in the eyes of this group

8. Does RCC use any special paper forms to record the substance or disposition of calls received?
 (i) No (ii) Yes

IF "YES," We would appreciate it if we could get a blank sample of these forms.

9. a. Does RCC make any aggregate records of calls received?
 (i) No (ii) Yes

b. IF "YES," Could we see these?

- **10. What were the major types of questions asked of the RCC during this crisis? (INTERVIEWER: ASK FOR EXAMPLES)

11. a. Were there any distinguishable patterns in the calls that came into the RCC during this period of tension?
 (i) NO (ii) Yes

b. IF "YES," How would you describe these patterns?
 (Example: frequency of calls increased right after newscasts, content of calls changed from ____ to ____ after the second night, etc.)

12. If a caller asks a question about a rumor and RCC does not know the answer, what procedure is followed?

PROBE FOR:

- (i) take caller's number and phone him back after we get the information
 (ii) take caller's number and phone him back if we later get the information supplied to us
 (iii) hold caller on the line while we check with our contacts to find out the information
 (iv) ask caller to phone back later
 (v) other (please specify) _____

- 13. Incidents often occur which appear to have the potential for erupting into a civil disorder, yet they do not.

a. Have there been any such "potential crises" which the RCC was instrumental in preventing from materializing?

- (i) No (ii) Yes

b. IF "YES," Could you tell me about one or two of these incidents?
 (INTERVIEWER: PROBE FOR HOW MANY, WHEN, AND THE NATURE OF EACH SITUATION)

14. a. Considering the entire history of the RCC, to what extent do you feel that its "tension reducing" efforts have been effective?
- b. To what do you attribute this effectiveness or lack of it?

PART VI. CONCLUSION

1. Does the RCC have any reports of its involvement in any community crises which it would provide to the Disaster Research Center?
(i) Yes (enclosed)
(ii) Yes (DRC contact RCC)
(iii) No
- *2. In a general way, what do you foresee will be the future of the RCC in your community?
3. What groups and/or individuals in your community must look favorably upon the RCC for it to be successful?
4. So that we have a feel for the context in which your operations are conducted, could you give me a general description of the state of race relations here in (name of city).
5. Is there anything that has not been covered in this questionnaire that would help us to better understand the RCC of its operations?

THANK YOU VERY MUCH

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE

- I. Part of the intent of this study is to learn about the ways that a small organization like a RCC is similar to, and different than, a large bureaucracy. The checklist below includes a number of features of a bureaucracy. Please check (✓) whether or not (or to what extent) each feature is found in your RCC. Note: You may find that many of your answers are the same, but please answer each one carefully, even if it seems silly.

Feature	<u>Is</u> found in our RCC	<u>Is not</u> found in our RCC
<p>A. 1. Written charter or written statement of purpose of RCC</p> <p>2. Existence of a table of organization or "organizational chart"</p> <p>3. Any <u>written</u> policies</p> <p>4. Written job description or manual giving details of how to do any job on RCC staff</p> <p>5. Sometimes certain jobs or tasks have a FORMAL title such as those listed below. Please check whether each is, or is not, a <u>distinct</u> feature of your RCC and add any <u>other formal job titles</u> which may exist in your RCC:</p> <p>a. Board of Directors (of RCC only)</p> <p>b. Over-all Supervisor (or Director, Co-ordinator)</p> <p>c. Over-all Co-Superviosr (or Co-Director)</p> <p>d. Assistant Supervisor (or Asst. Director, Advisor to Director, Team Captain, Shift Leader)</p> <p>e. Coordinator of Volunteers</p> <p>f. Liaison to Police or to Civil Defense Center</p> <p>g. Liaison to other organization (please specify)</p> <p>h. Weekend or night-time on-call duty</p> <p>i. Field Worker</p> <p>j. Police Department Radio Monitor Person</p> <p>k. Commercial Radio and/or TV Monitor Person</p> <p>l. Operator (or Answerer)</p> <p>m. Rumor-Checker (or Verifier, Investigator)</p> <p>n. Runner (within the RCC)</p> <p>o. Clerk (or Typist, Secretary, Log Keeper)</p>		

Feature	<u>Is</u> found in our RCC	<u>Is not</u> found in our RCC
p. Relief Operator q. Other _____ r. Other _____ s. Other _____		
6. Existence of a file or file folder on RCC		
7. Record of amount of time put in by RCC workers		
8. Record of amount of work (e.g., number of calls handled) by RCC workers		
B. 1. Scheduling of who will be on-call or on-duty during a certain period of time: a. persons scheduled by day in advance b. persons scheduled by week in advance c. persons scheduled by month in advance		
2. Supervisor "checks up" on (or monitors) how RCC staff is handling calls		
3. Job evaluation of RCC staff by leader or supervisor		
4. Discipline: a. Specific offenses designated b. Specific penalties designated c. Specific procedures designated for dismissing staff		
5. Presence of a research and development branch of RCC		
6. Policy on recruitment of people to work in or for RCC		
7. Specific procedures (e.g., grading, testing, interview by supervisor or personnel officer) for selecting persons to work in or for RCC (If "Yes," please circle which)		
8. Participation by anyone affiliated with RCC in community speaking engagements or demonstrations about RCC		

Feature	Is found in our RCC	Is <u>not</u> found in our RCC
9. Discretion of RCC phone answers in carrying out their duties: a. Very little b. Very much c. Other (please specify) _____		

- C. 1. Who makes the decisions within and about RCC? How are they reached?
2. What are some of the rules for the RCC staff and how closely are they followed?
3. What is the atmosphere of the RCC usually like when it is activated? (Especially, how formal?)
4. What proportion of the staff of the RCC (excluding clerk-typists) are required by the RCC or by its parent organization (such as the HRC of which it may be a part) to have a college degree?
 (i) None (ii) Less than half (iii) Half or more
- D. 1. Please describe any changes in the RCC since I visited you on _____. We are particularly interested in changes in emphasis, goals, functions, funding, equipment, relations with police department, or any other changes which you can cite.
2. Has your community, since I visited you, been faced with a period of heightened tension, strain, or crisis during which the RCC received more than the usual number of calls per week?
 (i) No (ii) Yes

If "Yes," please complete the table below:

Date(s)	Approximate Number of Calls Received	Duration	Nature of the Incident
			George Wallace shooting Disaster (please specify) Other _____

3. In a general way, what do you foresee will be the future of your RCC?
4. If your city was granted \$20,000 per year to be spent only for RCC, what would you do with it?

5. How do the positions which you checked in Question A5 fit together to form the table of organization ("organizational chart") of the RCC? That is, using the remainder of this page, please draw the table of organization for crisis times and a separate one for non-crisis times. Or, if these are already available elsewhere just enclose a copy please.

APPENDIX C

**THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY**

November 16, 1972

Director
Human Relations Commission

Dear Sir:

The Disaster Research Center is a part of the Ohio State University's Department of Sociology. It has been engaged since 1963 in field studies of community emergencies in many different countries throughout the world. The results of these studies are published in various forms and made available to community officials in order that they may benefit from the experiences of their counterparts in other cities. In one such sociological study we are currently focusing on "Rumor Control Centers" in all cities of 100,000 population in the United States.

Already site visits have been made to more than thirty (30) cities from coast to coast in an attempt to include every city which has a Rumor Control Center. I would be very much indebted to you if you would be so kind as to provide us with information concerning whether or not a mechanism of this general type (or some close variant of it) does indeed exist in your city, or has existed in the past in your city. The information we are seeking is merely the name, address, telephone number and organizational affiliation of any officials or citizens' groups who are now, or have been, involved in rumor control type activities. We will then contact such organizations or persons ourselves.

To give you a more detailed idea of what we are looking for, the phenomenon has usually taken the form of a central telephone answering desk which citizens may call to report on or check the validity of some rumor they have heard. Our research interests include personal crisis centers only to the extent that the latter also respond to community emergencies or crises.

Work on this project has already brought us into contact with many members of the National Association of Human Rights Workers, most of whom have indicated that they benefited both directly or indirectly

from participating in this project. However, we do guarantee that the anonymity of our respondents and any information obtained from the organizations they represent is protected at all times. I have enclosed more information on our organization for your interest.

Whatever help you can provide will be deeply appreciated. The value of our study and its accuracy is obviously totally dependent upon the cooperation of officials such as yourself. We thank you ahead of time for your assistance.

Sincerely,

J. Rick Ponting
Coordinator, Rumor Control
Center Project

JRP/drc
Enclosures

APPENDIX D

Disaster Research Center
127-129 W. 10th Ave.
Columbus, Ohio
43201

RUMOR CONTROL CENTERS STUDY

1. Name of City and State: _____

2. Please check the appropriate answers below:

a. Yes _____ No _____ Our city does have a designated telephone number where citizens can call to check out rumors.

If "No," please proceed to Question 3.

If "Yes":

b. Yes _____ No _____ This Rumor Control Center (RCC) operates on a year-round basis.

c. Yes _____ No _____ This RCC operates on a "stand-by" basis.

d. Other _____ Please specify _____

3. a. Yes _____ No _____ Our city formerly had an RCC, but has not activated it since approximately _____ (year).

b. Yes _____ No _____ Our city's RCC has been disbanded, but if the need ever arises we could and would set one up again, at least temporarily.

c. Other _____ Please specify _____

4. If your city has now, or has ever had, an RCC-type operation, please include the following information:

a. Official name of RCC: _____

b. Name of Director or Supervisor of RCC: _____

c. Name of larger organization, if any, of which RCC is a part: _____

d. Address of RCC: _____

e. Telephone Number of RCC: Area Code _____ Phone _____

f. Any other information which you may be able to supply (e.g., year first established, approximate number of calls received per year, staff size, etc.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, William A. Local Civil Defense in Natural Disaster: From Office to Organization. Disaster Research Center Report Series, No. 7. Columbus, Ohio, 1969.
- Azumi, Koya. "Environmental Needs, Resources, and Agents." Organizational Systems. Edited by Koya Azumi and Jerald Hage. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972.
- Azumi, Koya, and Hage, Jerald, eds. Organizational Systems. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972.
- Becker, Howard, and Greer, Blanche. "Latent Culture: A Note on the Theory of Latent Social Roles." Administrative Science Quarterly 5 (1960): 304-313.
- Becker, Selwyn, and Gordon, Gerald. "An Entrepreneurial Theory of Formal Organizations. Part I. Patterns of Formal Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 11 (1966): 315-344.
- Bennis, Warren, and Slater, Philip. The Temporary Society. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
- Bertrand, Alvin. Social Organization. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Co., 1972.
- Blau, Peter. "A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations." American Sociological Review 35 (1970): 201-218.
- _____ ; Heydebrand, Wolf; and Stauffer, Robert. "The Structure of Small Bureaucracies." American Sociological Review 31 (1966): 179-191.
- Brinkerhoff, Merlon, and Kunz, P. R., eds. Complex Organizations and their Environments. Dubuque, Iowa: W. C. Brown Co., 1972.
- Buckley, Walter. Sociology and Modern Systems Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
- Burns, Tom, and Stalker, G. M. The Management of Innovation. London: Tavistock, 1961.
- Campbell, Donald, and Stanley, Julian. Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963.

- Dean, John; Eichorn, Robert; and Dean, Lois. "Limitations and Advantages of Unstructured Methods." Issues in Participant Observation. Edited by George McCall and J. L. Simmons. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969.
- Downie, N. M., and Heath, R. W. Basic Statistical Methods. 2d Edition. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
- Drabek, Thomas. "A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Organizational Stress." Department of Sociology, University of Colorado, Denver, n.d. An extended version of a paper presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meetings, Denver, August 30 - September 2, 1971.
- Dynes, Russell, and Quarantelli, E. L. "Property Norms and Looting: Their Patterns in Community Crises." Phylon 31 (1970): 168-182.
- Emery, F. E., and Trist, E. L. "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments." A paper read at the XVII International Congress of Psychology, Washington, D. C., August 20-26, 1963. Reprinted in Merlon Brinkerhoff and P. R. Kunz, eds. Complex Organizations and their Environments. Dubuque, Iowa: W. C. Brown, 1972.
- Etzioni, Amitai. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates. New York: Free Press, 1961.
- Form, William, and Nosow, Sigmund. Community in Disaster. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958.
- Forrest, Thomas. "Structural Differentiation in Emergent Groups." Ph.D. dissertation. The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1972.
- Friedland, William, and Nelkin, Dorothy. "Migrant Labor as a Form of Intermittent Social Organization and as a Channel of Geographic Mobility." New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, May 1967.
- Friedlander, Frank, and Pickle, Hal. "Components of Effectiveness in Small Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (1968): 289-304.
- Gearing, Fred. "The Structural Poses of Eighteenth Century Cherokee Villages." American Anthropologist 40 (1958): 1148-1157.
- Glazer, Barney, and Strauss, Anselm. The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967.

- Gouldner, Alvin. "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles. I." Administrative Science Quarterly 2 (1957): 281-306.
- _____. "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles. II." Administrative Science Quarterly 4 (1958): 444-480.
- Hall, Richard. "The Concept Bureaucracy: An Empirical Assessment." American Journal of Sociology 69 (1963): 32-41.
- _____. "Intraorganizational Structural Variation: Application of the Bureaucratic Model." Administrative Science Quarterly 7 (1962): 295-308.
- _____; Haas, Eugene; and Johnson, Norman. "Organizational Size, Complexity, and Formalization." American Sociological Review 32 (1967): 903-912.
- _____, and Little, Charles. "A Note on Bureaucracy and its 'Correlates'." American Journal of Sociology 72 (1966): 267-272.
- Hickson, D. F. "A Convergence in Organization Theory." Administrative Science Quarterly 11 (1966): 224-237.
- Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry. San Francisco: Chandler, 1964.
- Kaplan, Berton. "Notes on a Non-Weberian Model of Bureaucracy: The Case of Development Bureaucracy." Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (1968): 471-480.
- _____. "A Commentary on 'Organizations and Social Development'." Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (1968): 484-490.
- Katz, Daniel, and Kahn, Robert. "Organizations and the Systems Concept." Complex Organizations. Edited by Brinkerhoff and Kunz.
- Kerner, Otto. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam Books, 1968.
- Killian, Louis. "The Significance of Multiple-group Membership in Disaster." American Journal of Sociology 57 (1952): 309-314.
- Klapp, Orrin. Currents of Unrest: An Introduction to Collective Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972.

- Klonglan, Gerald; Mulford, Charles; and Griffin, Charles. "The Enactment of Ephemeral Roles in Disaster." Journal Paper No. J-7474 of the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experimental Station, Ames, Iowa, 1972.
- Knopf, Terry Anne. Rumors, Race, and Riots. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1973 (forthcoming).
- Lawrence, Paul, and Lorsch, Jay. "Differentiation and Integration in Complex Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (1967): 1-47.
- Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence. Riot Data Review 1,2,3,4. Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts, 1968-1970.
- Levine, Sol, and White, Paul. "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships." Administrative Science Quarterly 5 (1961): 583-601.
- Lynton, Rolf. "Linking an Innovative Subsystem into the System." Administrative Science Quarterly 14 (1969): 398-416.
- McCall, George, and Simmons, J. L. Issues in Participant Observation. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969.
- Meyer, Marshall. "Size and the Structure of Organizations: A Causal Analysis." American Sociological Review 37(1972): 434-440.
- Middleton, Jack, and Runner, Phil. "Community Information Center: Case Study." Journal of Intergroup Relations 1 (1972): 3-37.
- Miles, Matthew. Innovation in Education. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964.
- Palisi, Bartolomeo. "Some Suggestions About the Transitory-Permanence Dimension of Organizations." British Journal of Sociology 21 (1970): 200-206.
- Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. New York: Free Press, 1951.
- _____. "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations." Complex Organizations. Edited by Amitai Etzioni. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962.
- _____; Bales, Robert; and Shils, Edward. Working Papers in the Theory of Action. New York: Free Press, 1953.
- _____, and Smelser, Neil. Economy and Society. New York: Free Press, 1956.

- Perrow, Charles. Organizational Analysis: A Sociological View. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970.
- Ponting, Rick. "Rumor Control Centers: Their Emergence and Operations." American Behavioral Scientist 16 (1973): 391-401.
- Pugh, D. S.; Hickson, D. F.; Hinings, C. R.; and Turner, C. "Dimensions of Organization Structure." Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (1968): 65-105.
- _____. "The Context of Organization Structures." Administrative Science Quarterly 14 (1969): 91-114.
- Pugh, D. S.; Hickson, D. F.; and Hinings, C. R. "An Empirical Taxonomy of Structures of Work Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 14 (1969): 115-126.
- Pugh, D.S.; Hickson, D. F.; and Pheysey, D. C. "Operations Technology and Organizational Structure: An Empirical Reappraisal." Administrative Science Quarterly 14 (1969): 378-397.
- Quarantelli, E. L. "Emergent Accomodation Groups." Human Nature and Collective Behavior. Edited by Tamotsu Shibutani. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1970.
- Rosengren, W. R. "Structure, Policy, and Style." Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (1967): 140-164.
- Rosner, Martin. "Economic Determinants of Organizational Innovation." Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (1968): 614-625
- "Rumor Control Center Tells What's Happening." Southern California Business. October 22, 1968: 48-49.
- Shibutani, Tamotsu. Improvised News: A Sociological Study of Rumor. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1972.
- Simmel, Georg. Conflict. Translated by K. H. Wolff. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956.
- Simpson, Richard, and Gulley, Richard. "Goals, Environmental Pressures and Organizational Characteristics." American Sociological Review 27 (1962): 344-351.
- Singer, Benjamin D. The Detroit Riot of July 1967. Detroit: Behavior Research Institute, 1967.
- _____; Osborn, Richard; and Geschwender, James. Black Rioters: A Study of Social Factors and Communication in the Detroit Riot. Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath Lexington, 1970.

- Straus, Anselm, et al. "Field Tactics." Issues in Participant Observation. Edited by McCall and Simmons.
- Terreberry, Shirley. "The Evolution of Organizational Environments." Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (1968): 614-625.
- Teuber, Erwin. "Integrating Mechanisms in a Community Conflict Environment: Human Relations Commissions in Seventeen Cities." Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1972.
- Toffler, Alvin. Future Shock. New York: Random House, 1970.
- Turner, Ralph. "Collective Behavior." Handbook of Modern Sociology. Edited by Robert Faris. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964.
- United States Bureau of the Census. Census of Population: 1970. General Population Characteristics, Final Report PC(1)-B. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971.
- United States Department of Justice, Community Relations Service. "Conference on 'The Value of Establishing Rumor Control Centers' Report." (Mimeographed) Washington, D. C., n.d.
- United States Senate Committee on Governmental Operations, Subcommittee on Investigations. Riots, Civil, and Criminal Disorders: Hearings, Part 13. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968.
- Warner, Keith, and Havens, Eugene. "Coal Displacement and the Intangibility of Organizational Goals." Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (1968): 539-555.
- Williams, Lawrence, and Erchak, Gerald. "Rumor Control Centers in Civil Disorders." Police Chief Magazine (May 1969): 26-32.
- Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. New York: Free Press, 1947.
- Zelditch, Morris. "Some Methodological Problems of Field Studies." Issues in Participant Observation. Edited by McCall and Simmons.